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Litigation Supreme Court of India

Reforming a system that rewards lawyer misconduct – a conversation between Apar Gupta and Sanjay Hegde on #PatialaHouse

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(Apar Gupta is a Delhi-based advocate and Sanjay Hegde is a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of India.)

From: Apar Gupta

Dear sir,

I am writing to you looking for answers and for hope.

The practice of law is an art but it has never required martial combat. One week ago, lawyers in the Patiala House courts challenged the genteel nature of legal practice by practising criminal assaults in the court premises. This has been done successively over two days within the premises of the court complex and besides the India Gate circle. I repeat this because the location is important. It shows how less than a mile away from the Supreme Court, the rule of law was subverted to a rule by force.

On February 16, 2016, some lawyers acting in groups beat up Kanhaiya Kumar a student, his family, friends, college professors, and journalists. On February 17, 2016, when reports of similar assaults emerged, six senior advocates were rushed to that location under orders of the Supreme Court. Reports indicate that even though they went to the Patiala House Courts with police protection, stones and flowerpots were flung at them. They were called dreadful abuses accusing them of incest and questioning their allegiance to the country. On returning to the Supreme Court, they called the situation, “unprecedented”.

This raises a frightening possibility – a situation in which the writ of the Supreme Court stops at the steps of the Patiala House Court. Where even under its supervision, lawyers not only defy the law but also exhibit such defiance on national television. The practice of law requires courage but it has never required the audacity to undermine the Supreme Court.

It would be myopic to reduce the blame to a few violent lawyers. The Delhi Police bore witness to this affront to the rule of law on both days. It did not prevent the violence. It did not police. The Delhi Police Commissioner in subsequent interviews has said that preventing the violence could have caused “collateral damage”, an apt term owing its seed in popular culture to the Gulf War and drone strikes. It captures the deprivation of basic human rights of an accused and working journalists perfectly. It displays how norms of human decency, which find their way in law, give way to the rule of force and might. Brazen statements by the Commissioner and the police inaction on the second day despite judicial oversight raise further questions on the Court’s authority.

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Alexander Hamilton in the federalist papers termed the judiciary, “the least dangerous branch”. He reasoned that the Court relies on the existing branches to ensure compliance and enforce its orders, compliance that comes through the obedience of the political executive and the police acting under it. This is necessary in a society that is governed by a rule of law. When lawyers publicly exhibit defiance to it and the police condone it — how is the Court to act? Does it moderate or limit the wide powers it can exercise for contempt? Does it err on the side of caution? Is it not reasonable to fear that any hesitance to act firmly may encourage further acts of defiance, which seek immunity by false claims of nationalism?

There is some reason for my pessimism. On December 2, 2014 the Supreme Court issued a peculiar circular. It said, “On 24.11.2014 an Advocate, wearing black gown, band and a saffron color long gown entered into the Hon’ble Chief Justice’s Court which was viewed seriously. It has been directed that, in future, Advocates only in proper uniform be allowed entry into the Court Rooms.” On February 18, 2016 in the midst of a hearing in the Supreme Court concerning the Patiala House Court violence a lawyer disrupted proceedings shouting, “Vande Mataram”. Reports indicate that the Court pardoned him after he offered an apology. Reports further indicate that after being pardoned, he came out of the courtroom and stated, “I am not ashamed of what I did”. Viewed individually, the first incident is a minor transgression and the second is an attempt to overawe a court hearing. In both instances, the transgressions have received minor censure from the Court – a determination that rests solely within its discretion. I fear that further judicial compassion will only be mistaken for weakness.

But how far can the Court act under contempt? Can it trust the police to enforce the law? Events over the past few weeks bring me an acute sense of shame. This gives way to the much larger discomfort of threats to judicial independence — a situation when judicial orders reduce to mere words and the words in our statutes no longer have meaning; a society where the rule of law compromises its existence with the rule of force.

Sincerely,

Apar

From: Sanjay Hegde

Dear Apar,

To my mind, there is no doubt that the actions of the violent lawyers in Patiala house are criminal, destructive of the rule of law, and in contempt of the orders of the Supreme Court. They would in all probability be convicted if prosecuted properly or if proceeded against under the Contempt of Courts Act. I hope that they indeed are so proceeded against.

However, the prosecution and conviction of these individuals will be merely cosmetic if the underlying causes are not addressed. The chief cause to my mind, is that in a legal system that is stagnant and overwhelmed by the burden of arrears, only two kinds of lawyers get noticed, either the very famous or the very notorious. Notoriety is easier to achieve than fame, and a notorious lawyer, in due course gets cleansed into respectable authority, when he begins to invoke fearful compliance from opponents and courts.

A reputation as a troublemaker is not a bad reputation, when confronting judges who want to struggle through their never-ending list of cases to be heard on that day. A troublemaker lawyer, who can call for a strike and violence, who can paralyse the working of courts, will find himself being humored by judges who do not want trouble in the courtroom. Such a lawyer will soon find himself engaged by parties who want to overawe a court or derail proceedings in any matter. He will also be engaged by parties in a righteous cause, who will brief him only to prevent him from going over to the other side.

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A troublemaker who can cow down judges is also more likely to be elected as a representative of the Bar than a lawyer whose chief virtue is well-researched articulation in court. These elected leaders of the Bar then get invited to social functions at welcomes and farewells involving judges. Elected offices at Bar associations then translate into upturns in practice. The ability to win a Bar election sometimes translates into a political candidacy as well. It seems to me that the system as it now exists, does not punish bad conduct but actually rewards it.

While Patiala House may have attracted attention because of its proximity to the Supreme Court, similar hooliganism has been seen in Chennai and Karnataka in recent years. In Chennai, the Chief Justice had to resort to Central forces, to ensure the conduct of peaceful proceedings in court. There are also times when Bar associations pass resolutions refusing legal assistance to some accused and then seek to enforce their diktat by violence. A decade ago in Jammu and Kashmir, trials of those accused in a sex scam had to be transferred outside the state because of such a resolution. Bluntly put, the average individual lawyer in India is less likely to be an Atticus Finch and more likely to follow or lead a mob.

The answer has necessarily to come from lawyers themselves. How do we make mob rule unprofitable and unsupported? How do we ensure that the leader of the mob today, is not the leader of the Bar tomorrow? How do we decriminalise our courts as a necessary precursor to the decriminalisation of politics itself? The all powerful Supreme Court in Delhi, if it fails to ensure condign punishment at Patiala House, may well become like that blind Mughal Emperor of whose nationwide jurisdiction, it came to be said, “Dilli te Palam, ast zameen Shah Alam”. From Delhi to Palam is the land of Shah Alam.

Regards,

Sanjay Hegde

From: Apar Gupta

Sir,

Two prominent points indicated by you in the previous thread push our conversation beyond the law of contempt. The first is case pendency and the second are usurpers at the helm of our Bar associations and councils. Both problems as you indicate are structural and require systematic engagement with time and patience. This can only be implemented specifically through the state bar councils and not episodic interventions by the Court. But what is the Bar Council today?

In my view, bar councils today act in the interest of lawyers but not in the interest of the legal profession. While they have the ability to structurally engage on issues of professional ethics and development, they rarely perform such a role, reduced over time to a body with allegiances to local groups aligned on lines of caste and religion and worse, political parties. While lawyers have always formed a large contingent of parliamentarians, there was always a conscious attempt to keep electoral politics at a distance from the practice of law. The independence of the judiciary is supported from the neutrality of the bar. This is increasingly under threat.

Recent events in which office bearers use the strength of their position to campaign for a political party, send SMSs soliciting support, and even hold seminars and rallies focused on lawyers give a cause for concern. Such incidents loosely link the social interest necessary in legal practice towards obedience and servitude of a particular political ideology. This is dangerous. For me, many lawyers (including me) who have been silent at such events in the past are to blame for the increasing brazenness that ultimately fructified in the Patiala House courts. I think any lawyer, whether working in a legal aid clinic or structuring a complex commercial agreement, can sense a growing influence of electoral politics in the practice of law. It is for the profession to decide whether they are willing to tolerate it further.

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Another instance on which I see complete inaction by state bar councils are strikes organised by lawyers. Coordinated calls for strikes sometimes even arise from bar council members. Despite repeated and clear judgments by the Supreme Court that such strikes are illegal, this affront to the rule of law continues, practised by the very people who are licensed to professionally protect it. Even the courts maintain a studied silence when bar councils and associations announce strikes. Some even condone it by adjourning cases casually and treating it as an unsanctioned school holiday.

In my view, the continuing district court strikes over the past two years in Delhi have given lumpen elements in the Bar the confidence necessary to now open a larger front on professional ethics itself. Members of the legal community, especially seniors, need to actively support juniors whose bread and butter is immediately impacted due to the threats of violence and coercion which are used to prevent them from appearing in courts where such strikes are announced.

Strikes are just one form of a breach of professional ethics contained in the Advocates Act. The absence of action under it by bar councils is a worrying sign. It also points to a larger rot where complaints are dealt with in an opaque process and proximity to members of a bar council rather than the merits of a case may determine a finding of misconduct or the penalty which is imposed. To me the regulations require immediate surgical intervention. The hoary language that extolls the virtues of advocacy needs to be replaced by the commercial professionalism that a modern legal practice demands. The opaque and rusted process needs to be reformed after studying the reasons why the remedies suffer such weak enforcement.

One of my favourite quotes on this branch of law comes from the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court where observing rampant professional misconduct, it notes that, “Such conduct reminds us of the fictional barrister Rumpole, `the Old Hack of Bailey’, who self deprecatingly described himself as an `old taxi plying for hire’. He at least was not bereft of professional values. When a young and enthusiastic journalist invited him to a drink of Dom Perignon, vastly superior and far more expensive than his usual `plonk’, `Chbteau Fleet Street’, he joined him with alacrity but when in the course of the drink the journalist offered him a large sum of money for giving him a story on the case; `why he was defending the most hated woman in England’, Rumpole ended the meeting simply saying “In the circumstance I think it is best if I pay for the Dom Perignon””. Unsurprisingly this judgment arises from a finding of contempt of court and not professional misconduct as found by a bar council. While this may merely be anecdotal, it is telling that contempt law is only imperfectly filling in a vacuum created by the bar councils.

Regards,

Apar

From: Sanjay Hegde

Dear Apar,

Thank you for recollecting the Rumpole example. I have a confession to make. Rumpole has been a great teacher to me for long, and I did introduce the series to Justice Alam who used it in the R.K. Anand judgment. It does seem to me that if Rumpole was Indianised to Vakil Rampal and a series set in a district court in India, many an appropriate lesson could be taught to the average Indian lawyer.

Rumpole would teach him that the first requirement of an advocate is courage, but that courage is not displayed by participation in or leadership of a mob. A lawyer’s true courage is when he gets up on his hind legs and cross-examines his witness to elicit the truth, regardless of suggestions from even a bully of a judge like Justice Bullingham, or from the icy condescension of a Justice Graves.

Rumpole would also teach a lawyer, that courage is in not meekly submitting to the advice of even your chamber mates and your friends, when such advice is detrimental to the client’s interests. A lawyer would learn also from the threat of disciplinary proceedings that Rumpole was subjected to by being reported to the benchers of his inn and to the professional services board. Lawyers could learn also from Rumpole’s fierce independence, which cost him a shot at being designated a Queen’s Counsel. In short, a Rumpolean philosophy of never pleading guilty, while forever perfecting the craft of persuasion, in a life interspersed with small cigars and Pomeroy’s ordinary wine, is a model with which many an individual lawyer would agree.

While the life of an Old Bailey hack epitomised by Rumpole is fast becoming an anachronism in Britain, it is still achievable for a Vakil Rampal, if only the profession as a whole sees itself as something more than a mere trade union of purveyors of the justice system. The Indian advocate often sees himself not as an officer of the court, but as a champion of his client within it. A lawyer usefully employed within the system, often does not have the time to look beyond his brief. But for large swathes of the profession, it is a mere refuge from the world outside, and a badge of a vocation no matter how tenuous. A lawyer suffering from disguised unemployment is an easy mark for the leader who is in want of a flock. Many a political party is populated with people who are nominally lawyers, but are rarely seen making a legal submission. Practice as a lawyer, is a useful adjunct to many a business like property dealings and the like. In short, the time available to a lawyer waiting to be briefed, is often a resource that is wasted or put to dishonorable pursuits.

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With disguised employment being the bane of an overcrowded profession, a number of people reliant on uncertain incomes tend to seek and find supplementary sources. These multitudes are often treated as individuals, only when their vote is solicited for elections to the bar associations of courts or to bar councils at the state and national levels.

Disciplining errant members of the Bar and checking their certifications and qualifications are all left to these elected bodies. Those who seek election to these bodies are loathe to move against potential and existing voters. Expecting elected bar councils to police the profession is an exercise in unwarranted optimism.

Courts too have contributed to the decline in standards by refusing to deny audience to errant members of the bar. R.K. Anand’s Case was unique in its invocation of contempt powers, but it was aided by press exposure, coupled with the vulnerability of Anand, who as a Senior Advocate, risked getting his designation revoked. It was in fact revoked and was a punishment that could not have been visited upon the average lawyer.

To my mind, the situation will not improve unless the lawyer genuinely is made to realise that he is an officer of the court and that the court has powers to curtail his continued tenure in that office. Unless a lawyer becomes a stakeholder in an organised system of justice delivery and ceases to act as a robber baron ruling through violence, the rule of law will not be truly established.

Regards,

Sanjay Hegde

From: Apar Gupta

Sir,

Your email gives a chance for introspection. It indicates that the answers many lawyers are searching for are present in their own practice. They are also timely, given the Supreme Court is examining the legality of the All India Bar Examination. Despite the derision directed against it, in principle few would quarrel with its aim to improve the quality of advocates in India — qualities both of the mind and the heart.

The Law Commission of India has been alive to these concerns for decades. In its 75th Report given in October 1978 titled “Disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act”, it underscores the need for self-regulation. Commending the system of advocates who form part of the disciplinary committees it recommends no change to the Advocates Act. It only takes a decade for it to revise and reverse this view. In 1988, in the 131st Report, the Law Commission noted two important things. First, a fall, or a “devaluation” of the lawyer in the public eye and second, a “hesitance to accept this implantable fact”. It suggests two key changes in the disciplinary system for adjudicating misconduct by advocates. It suggests that high courts should be given suo motu powers to review determinations made by the bar council of a state. There is also a suggestion for a social audit conducted by members of the public and civil society as “consumers of justice”. These are just two measures in a multitude which may be devised. There is an urgent need to devise substantive ethics regulations, periodic competency reviews, and enforce it by a system which is efficient and insulated from political pressure.

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I agree with you that the best hope for the legal profession is in the daily practice of each lawyer but systems should create the proper incentives for its existence. Recent events give us a chance to not only individually reflect but also review the existing rules and systems for professional misconduct.

Thank you sir for engaging on this issue playing on the minds of many lawyers over the past two weeks. More personally, this exchange has given me the hope necessary to keep looking for answers.

Warmly,

Apar

From: Sanjay Hegde

Dear Apar,

While we agree that long term measures, based on greater professionalisation and lesser politicisation is the way to go, the immediate question is what immediate measures can be put in place towards that end.

Firstly, the Patiala House incidents must be used to totally disincentivise criminal behaviour of the type exemplified by Vikram Chauhan and his group. The Supreme Court must use the opportunity to send a tough message, by ensuring and monitoring prosecutions and disciplinary actions. The Court could also use the opportunity to devise newer measures to ensure that hooliganism is not rewarded and is in fact a disqualification to any elected office, including in bar association elections. Judgments of the Supreme Court in respect of its own bar elections are now setting the agenda for elections to other bar associations. A disqualifying clause, to be administered by presiding judges, upon those accused of violence or intimidation, would be very useful.

The next step, which can’t be delayed now, is requiring that advocates certification be renewed from time to time. Credentials are checked cursorily upon enrollment and thereafter rarely questioned. If the rolls are to be compulsorily revalidated every five years to weed out those who can show no proof of serious practice, then a huge burden of non-professionals can be weeded out.

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It may also be a good idea for technological solutions to be put in place, with a national registry of qualified lawyers, whose fingerprint scans can be used for recording court appearances. Data on frequency of appearances in court, as opposed to attendance in bar rooms might be revealing.

All told, the basic issue is of requiring and enforcing professional pride, in ones standing as a lawyer. As the saying goes, “he who will not stand for anything, will fall for everything”.

Regards,

Sanjay Hegde

Categories
Human Rights Litigation

The High Court as trial court in death penalty confirmation proceedings

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Is a death sentence rendered by a sessions court final? Are there any checks on the powers of a sessions court over such an important decision? Can the High Court call new evidence in a death penalty proceeding? This note is an attempt for more clarity on these questions. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code”) under Section 28(2), directs that a death sentence can be passed only by a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge. Further, the Code ensures that a sentence of death passed by a court of sessions (comprising either the Sessions or the Additional Sessions Judge) shall be subject to confirmation proceedings before the High Court exercising jurisdiction over it. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the death sentence rendered by a sessions court is not final and is subject to the automatic supervision of the relevant High Court.

Sections 366 to 371 of the Code outline the confirmation proceedings before the High Court. In Bachan Singh (1980), the Apex Court noted that these provisions ensure that “the entire evidential material bearing on the innocence as[or] guilt of the accused and the question of sentence must be scrutinised with utmost caution and care by a superior court” considering that the outcome of the case would determine the life of an individual. It is interesting to note that similar confirmation provisions were also found in the old criminal procedure code of 1898 from Sections 374 to 380.

The confirmation process

Once the Sessions Court passes the death sentence, it is bound to refer the proceedings of the case to the High Court under Section 366(1) of the Code. Under Section 366(2) of the Code, a sentence of death cannot be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. As opposed to the 1898 Criminal Code, the 1973 Code includes a provision that authorises the Sessions Court to commit the convicted person to judicial custody (that is, jail). The Supreme Court has clarified in Sunil Batra (1979) that this custody cannot be considered equivalent to an imprisonment. The logic behind the provision is probably that the incentive to evade the legal process for a convicted person (sentenced to death by a sessions court) is very high and therefore the provisions seeks to address scenarios wherein the convict is not available for execution of the sentence.

It has been held in a catena of cases, including in State of Maharsahtra v. Sindhi and Jumman v. State of Punjab, that the confirmation proceedings are a continuation of the trial at the Sessions Court. Support for such an understanding can be derived from the fact that Section 366(1) states that the “proceedings” shall be submitted to the High Court unlike the appellate provisions where the factum of appeal lies in the conviction or acquittal or the enhancement of the sentence (Section 374 read with Section 386). There is however, a fundamental distinction between the confirmation proceedings at the High Court and a trial at the Sessions Court. While the Code, under Section 273, creates a general rule that all evidences taken in the course of the trial shall be taken in the presence of the accused, Section 367 states that the general rule in case of confirmation proceedings is that, unless the High Court feels otherwise, the presence of the convicted person is not required even when new evidence is taken. The Supreme Court has suggested that the presence or the absence of the accused does not make a difference at the confirmation stage since the High Court are duty bound to give the matters its utmost and undivided attention. Here, it is pertinent to mention that under the appellate jurisdiction, the Code in Section 391(3), grants the right to an accused (or his pleader) to be present when additional evidence is taken.

The Code also specifies that the confirmation proceedings should be conducted at least in front of a division bench of the High Court. Should there be any difference of opinion, the matter will be referred to a third judge whose decision will determine the final outcome of the case.

In death penalty cases, the normal practice is that the Sessions Court refers the matter for confirmation to the High Court and additionally, the convict files an appeal on his conviction under Section 374(2) of the Code. According to Section 368, the order of confirmation is not given until the appeal is disposed off by the high court. It is also clarified that there is no obligation on the convict that he must appeal his conviction to the High Court. Even if he does not, the constitutional court is duty bound to re-assess the death case.

Powers of the High Court

As discussed above, the power of a high court in confirmation proceedings is considered to be a continuation of trial. It is well settled that in a reference under the confirmation provision, the High Court has to consider the evidence afresh and arrive at its own independent findings with regard to the guilt of the accused, independent of the views of the Sessions Judge. At the same time, the Supreme Court has also cautioned that the conclusion arrived at by a sessions court cannot be completely overlooked.

Section 368 delineates the powers of a high court during a confirmation proceeding. The High Court can do the following: confirm the death sentence, pass any other sentence, annul the conviction but convict the accused of any other offence, order a new trial on the same or amended charge, and finally may also acquit the person. These powers look similar to the powers of the appellate court under Section 386. However, there are some essential differences between the confirmation and appellate proceedings.

Confirmation proceedings versus appellate proceedings

There are three major differences between the power of the High Court when it is seized of a confirmation proceeding and an appellate proceeding under the Code.

First, the reference to confirmation is automatic whereas appeal proceedings are only brought before the court if the distressed party files an appeal (and has a right to file one). A corollary of this situation is that in a criminal appeal, the court can dismiss the appeal if it decides that there is no ground for interference without examining the entire record. On the contrary, the High Court is duty bound to consider the entire evidence on record while confirming a death sentence.

Second, the confirmation court has a power to order further inquiry or take evidence (itself or by a lower court) without indicating any reason for doing so (under Section367(1)) whereas under Section 391(1), an appellate court has to provide written reasons to justify its act of taking new evidence (itself or by a lower court). Further, Section 391 does not empower the High Court sitting in the criminal appellate side to order further inquiry.

Finally, the appellate court has a certain leeway in not providing elaborate reasons should it agree with the findings of the trial court which is absent in confirmation cases. In confirmation proceedings, as written earlier, the High Court needs to come to an independent finding regarding the guilt of the accused and the sentence.

Special legislations and confirmation proceedings

Section 4(2) of the Code empowers the legislature to create separate trial proceedings for offences that are not part of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. There is therefore, a possibility that automatic confirmation proceedings available under the Code could be excluded. The (now repealed) Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 explicitly negated the role of the High Court and provided a direct right to appeal on both facts and law (not confirmation) to the Supreme Court under Section 19. Yakub Memon was hanged under this law and therefore, did not get the benefit of the confirmation proceedings at the High Court. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (also repealed), the Parliament provided a right to appeal to the High Court both “on facts and on law” which was similar to the confirmation proceedings (but not the same). The same model was followed in the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 through the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 under Section 21. In POTA and UAPA, the cases are not automatically referred to the High Court, rather they must be appealed. The major difference lies in the fact that in the special laws, the appellate court only looks at the points raised by the appellant and does not examine the entire record, unlike a confirmation proceedings which operates independently of an appeal. At first glance, this situation is counter intuitive. One expects increased safeguards when special laws provide for prolonged period of police custody and the reversal of the burden of proof but the opposite situation prevails.

(Nishant Gokhale and Lubhyathi Rangarajan are Associates at the Death Penalty Litigation Clinic, National Law University, Delhi. Amrutanshu Dash is a student in his fifth year at the same law school. The Clinic was an intervenor in Yakub Memon’s case. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.)

Categories
Litigation Skills

[Video] What traits are necessary for a career in litigation?

Apart from the necessary skills and the knowledge required to build and present a case before a judge, everybody knows that hard work is essential for a successful legal practice in the courts. But what else? Are there any other “x-factor” ingredients that successful litigators have but not many others have? We put this question to some of the brightest young minds working in Delhi’s courts. Watch the videos below to find out what attributes of character are necessary for a career in litigation.

So to sum up, a junior lawyer needs to have (a) the fortitude to handle long unpredictable hours, the financial uncertainty, and the mental and physical exhaustion of the early years in the profession; (b) a love for law and the profession; and (c) the skill to network and bring in work.

Categories
Litigation

‘Material facts’, ‘material particulars’ and other common CPC terms that are vital for a trial lawyer

JSaiDeepak_OnTrialThere are some terms that are frequently used in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), and it is important to understand them well because the maintainability of a civil action can depend on your understanding. As you know, the court will not address the merits of a dispute until it is prima facie satisfied about the maintainability of an action.

Cause of action, act, and interest

In Orders 1 and 2 of the CPC, where joinder of parties and causes of actions are discussed among other things, one frequently comes across the terms “cause of action”, “interest”, and “act or transaction”. While Order 1 Rule 1 refers to “acts or transactions”, Order 1 Rule 8, which permits the filing of a representative suit, clarifies in its explanation that those claiming to file a representative suit need only have the “same interest”, they need not have the “same cause of action”. What do these terms mean?

An “act or transaction” is different from “cause of action”. The former gives rise to the latter. An actionable cause arises from an act when the act amounts to the infraction of a party’s right. For instance, selling a patented product without consent is an act which gives rise to a cause of action in favour of the patentee. The same act could also give rise to different causes of action in favour of the same right owner or several right owners. In the example above, the sale of a product could result in infringement of a patent as well as a trademark held by the same individual or could infringe several patents held by unrelated parties.

In contrast to Order 1, Rule 1, which deals with joinder of plaintiffs and Order 1, Rule 3 which deals with joinder of defendants, Order 1, Rule 8,which permits filing of a representative suit, uses the term “interest” to increase the scope for joinder of parties beyond what is provided in Rules 1 and 3. The word “interest” has been used to facilitate adjudication of all questions which arise from the same set of acts or transactions. This provision is intended to avoid multiplicity of litigation where all persons are aggrieved by the same acts or transactions. Importantly, this permits one person to represent all other “interested parties”. For instance, if a host of tenants have an issue with an act or acts of the landlord, instead of filing multiple suits or instead of naming all tenants as parties in one suit, one tenant may represent the rest. Therefore, Rule 8 enlarges the scope of joinder of parties so long as there is a communion of “interest” between the parties.

The distinction between “act or transaction”, “cause of action”, and “interest” affects the maintainability of a civil action. The failure to disclose a prima facie cause of action, for instance, would result in the dismissal of a suit at the outset under Order 7, Rule 11. Similarly, to justify arraying a host of parties as defendants, a plaintiff must set out their relationship inter se, along with their nexus to the transaction which has given rise to the cause of action in favour of the plaintiff against all the defendants. Should the plaintiff fail to justify this, his plaint could be assailed for misjoinder of parties or non-joinder of necessary parties.

Now, let us look at “facts” and “particulars”, two terms that occur frequently in relation to pleadings in Order VI.

Facts, material facts, and material particulars

CPCcontentsOrder VI of the CPC, as discussed earlier, deals with pleadings. It uses the terms “material facts” and “particulars” in different places. Are “material facts” and “particulars” the same? The rules of statutory interpretation and even a common sense understanding of the English language tell us that there is a clear difference. “Facts” refer to the broad matrix or the canvas in the backdrop of which a dispute is contested. “Material facts” are those facts which must find mention in a party’s pleadings in order to establish a claim. “Particulars”, on the other hand, refer to the addition of greater detail to the facts.

The absence of material facts prejudices a party’s case at the outset. The absence of material particulars on the other hand, is curable. The Supreme Court has discussed the distinction between material facts and particulars in Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia (1975)In this case, the Court held that “all primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence are material facts”. The Court also explained the consequences of the absence of material facts and material particulars.

“The distinction between “material facts” and “material particulars” is important because different consequences may flow from a deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleading. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable to be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure.

If the petition is based solely on those allegations which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. In the case of a petition suffering from a deficiency of material particulars, the court has discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of limitation.”

These terms not only affect the the maintainability of an action, they also influence a party’s prospects at trial when a party is expected to lead evidence with respect to facts in issue. If such facts have not even been pleaded, the party cannot lead evidence to prove such facts. This would necessitate amendment of pleadings under Order 6, Rule 17, which can be a pretty messy affair.

In the next post, I will discuss interim applications under the CPC and the circumstances in which they may be employed.

 J.Sai Deepak, an engineer-turned-litigator, is an Associate Partner in the Litigation Team of NCR-based Saikrishna & Associates. Sai is @jsaideepak on Twitter and is the founder of the blawg “The Demanding Mistress” where he writes on economic laws, litigation and policy. All opinions expressed here are academic and personal.c 

Categories
Litigation Skills Specialised

My land is lying unused. Can I have it back? How to initiate repatriation under the 2013 land acquisition law

CommunitiesAndLegalAction_KanchiKohliEven as presentations were underway at a meeting on land rights somewhere in the capital, a lady seated next to me craved some specifics. “What is the latest with the land acquisition process in the country? Someone told me that I could actually get my land back? It had been taken away a decade ago.” Pushpa behan was among several people who had come for the meeting from the eastern part of the country and had lost her land to the expansion of a government-owned iron ore mine.

I pulled out the latest version of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“The RFCLARR Act). I knew that some of its clauses would apply to the question that she had raised.

We were temporarily distracted by a voice from the dais that informed the audience that the RFCLARR Act had replaced an 1894 land acquisition law under which the government had the power to acquire land for public purposes. A notice and a short time frame to move out of your home is all that people had. The RFCLARR Act had faced criticism but it had come a long way from the 1894 law and had linked the process of land acquisition with corresponding resettlement and rehabilitation obligations.

During a short tea break, we decided to step out to the canteen to talk at length. Our discussion soon revealed that about 20 families had lost about 100 hectares of agricultural land when the state government had issued them notices for evacuation. While their homes remained with them, the loss of their land had an impact on their source of livelihood. While she did not have many details, she also knew of others who had faced similar issues in neighbouring areas.

When we sat down to look at the Hindi version of the law together, I read out the two relevant clauses. Since the legalese was difficult to fathom, we broke it down. Just as we were talking, a few others from her village joined us. It was turning out to be an impromptu study session.

Section 101 is clear and simple. It says that “when any land acquired under this Act remains unutilised for a period of five years from the date of taking over the possession, the same shall be returned to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government by reversion in the manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government.” This however, applies only to land acquired under the 2013 law. That was not the case with Pushpa behan’s land.

Image from Vinoth Chandar's photostream on Flickr. CC BY 2.0

Image from Vinoth Chandar’s photostream on Flickr. CC BY 2.0

I asked Pushpa and the others if they had received any “award” or been paid compensation following the notice that their land was being acquired. Under the 1894 law, an award had to be issued by a District Collector or District Magistrate (depending on the state). Such an award would include details such as the true area of the land, the amount of compensation due, and the list of people among whom the compensation would be apportioned. Three scenarios could have emerged:

(1) no award was issued;

(2) an award was issued; and

(3) an award was issued but the physical possession of land was not taken and no compensation was paid.

Is repatriation possible?

Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 24 of the RFCLARR Act deal with these three scenarios. When no actual award was issued pursuant to a land acquisition notice under the 1894 law, then all the provisions related to compensation in the 2013 law would apply under Section 24(1)(a). The compensation available under the 2013 law is much higher and has to be determined using a range of criteria including market value of the land and damages incurred by standing crops or trees.

But this was not the case with Pushpa behan and the others from her village. They fell into the third category. Even though an award had been made in relation to the land that had been acquired, no compensation had been paid and physical possession of the land had not taken place for over eight years. Under Section 24(2), in such a situation, the proceedings of land acquisition undertaken so far would be deemed as lapsed and a fresh process would now need to be initiated under the 2013 law. This includes a detailed process of social impact assessment and the seeking of the consent of 70 per cent of the landholders in case the project is a public sector project or 80 per cent if there is private sector involvement.

(Left) The former Union Minister for Rural Development, Shri Jairam Ramesh addressing a press conference on Land Acquisition Bill, in Jaipur on September 15, 2013. (Right) The Union Minister for Road Transport & Highways and Shipping, Shri Nitin Gadkari addressing a Press Conference, during an Interaction with Farmer's Association on land acquisition, in Hyderabad on June 01, 2015. Both images from PIB.

(Left) The former Union Minister for Rural Development, Shri Jairam Ramesh addressing a press conference on Land Acquisition Bill, in Jaipur on September 15, 2013. (Right) The Union Minister for Road Transport & Highways and Shipping, Shri Nitin Gadkari addressing a Press Conference, during an Interaction with Farmer’s Association on land acquisition, in Hyderabad on June 01, 2015. Both images from PIB.

Does this mean that we have a chance to say no to this acquisition and possibly get back our land?” one person in the group enquired. In principle, yes, I said, but we still had to test it out. The 1894 law had no provision for social impact assessment or any provision about seeking consent and that is why many project authorities feel that the 2013 law would make it impossible for land to be acquired.

He asked, “if the compensation had been paid and physical possession taken in the last 5 years, then this possibility would not arise, right?” That’s what the law says as of now, I replied.

What next?

Several groups across the country have taken steps with the help of lawyers to get better compensation or to restart land acquisition processes under the 2013 law. In fact there is recent news that Reliance Industries has challenged this legal provision in the Gujarat High Court in response to a case filed by farmers.

But the 2013 law does not say that these processes need to be initiated through the courts alone. It is perhaps even possible to do so by approaching the departments that had first initiated land acquisition proceedings and where the records lie.

It would have been useful to have a set of executive rules to enable these provisions but the two and half years of the existence of this law has seen such resistance from the government that little attention has been paid to issue enabling rules. The clauses we had discussed were at the heart of a series of ordinances promulgated to amend the 2013 law and which were allowed to lapse last year.

For now, we know that these provisions are in place and are open for all to use. Pushpa smiled, took the copy of the Hindi text of the law from me and said, “Well, we have the clause in our favour for now and we have to try and use it. Get our paperwork in order and get going.” The half and hour we spent discussing what was and what could be had opened many doors.

Kanchi Kohli is a researcher working on law, environment justice, and community empowerment.