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12 ANGRY MEN (1957) AND EK RUKA HUA FAISLA (1986) – THE COURTROOM AS RED HERRING

SayakDasgupta_InCameraIn 1973, a boy named Kevin Edward Noonan took his high school sweetheart to watch a screening of a 1957 movie. She had just earned a full scholarship to Princeton and was considering going to law school in the future. Perhaps he hoped that watching a classic legal drama would inspire her. And it did. She was especially moved by a scene at around the hour mark in which an immigrant speaks about the greatness of the American judicial system. “This, I have always thought, is a remarkable thing about democracy,” he says. “That we are… what is the word? Notified! That we are notified by mail to come down to this place to decide on the guilt or innocence of a man we have never heard of before. We have nothing to gain or lose by our verdict. This is one of the reasons why we are strong.” The young girl, whose only legal inspiration till then had been Perry Mason, was blown away. “I had never thought about the juries and their function until I saw this movie,” she later said. “This was my very first inspiration. When the watchmaker in that scene talked about the greatness of democracy being the jury system? It sold me.” The movie was 12 Angry Men, and the girl was Sonia Sotomayor, the first Latina to become a judge at the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Origin Story

12 Angry Men was originally written as a fifty-minute teleplay in 1954 by Reginald Rose, one of a group of bright, socially-conscious up-and-coming screenwriters of the ‘50s – a decade known as the golden age of television drama in the US (much like the present decade) – that included such legends as Rod Serling and Paddy Chayefsky. Rose was inspired by his own experience of jury duty on a manslaughter case in New York City. Initially, he had been reluctant to serve on a jury, but, as he wrote later: “the moment I walked into the courtroom… and found myself facing a strange man whose fate was suddenly more or less in my hands, my entire attitude changed.” The gravity of the situation, the sombre activity of the court, and the “absolute finality” of the decision of the jurors made a deep impact on him. He felt that since no one other than the jurors had any idea of what went on in a jury room, “a play taking place entirely within a jury room might be an exciting and possibly moving experience for an audience”.

Opening pages of the stage play book

The result was a taut, gripping story about a jury that must decide the fate of a young Hispanic boy who has been accused of murdering his father. Eleven of the jurors believe that he is guilty, but only one man is unconvinced, and what proceeds is a tense debate on the facts of the case, a dismantling of all the ostensibly damning evidence, and also an airing of social stigmas and ingrained prejudices. A play written in the ‘50s will obviously have its attendant problems of representation; it might as well have been called “12 Straight White Men”. There are no women or persons of colour in the jury. But the plot allows for a range of characters fitting various archetypes. This becomes especially clear from the notes on characters and costumes in the stage play adaptation. Juror No. 2 is “a meek, hesitant man who finds it difficult to maintain any opinions of his own,” whereas Juror No. 3 is “very strong, forceful, extremely opinionated […] intolerant of opinions other than his own, and accustomed to forcing his wishes and views upon others.” Juror No. 7 is “a loud, flashy, glad-handed salesman type who has more important things to do than sit on a jury,” and is, basically “a bully, and, of course, a coward”, whereas Juror No. 11 “is a refugee from Europe […] who speaks with an accent and is ashamed, humble, almost subservient to the people around him.” There is the “man of wealth and position” who feels “a little bit above the rest of the jurors and whose “only concern is with the facts in the case”, and there is a “slick, bright advertising man who thinks of human beings in terms of percentages, graphs and polls”. Our hero, Juror No. 8 is a “quiet, thoughtful, gentle man”, a man “who wants justice to be done, and will fight to see that it is.” In other words, he is a lone warrior fighting an uphill battle against a room full of men opposed to him; an underdog fighting for another underdog. These are all tried and tested archetypes and they work really well.

Film Adaptations

The teleplay was adapted into a film directed by Sidney Lumet and starring Henry Fonda. Although the film didn’t fair very well at the box office, it gained almost universal critical acclaim, and is considered one of the most influential films ever made. The American Film Institute ranked it second in its list of the top 10 courtroom dramas of all time, just behind To Kill A Mockingbird (1962), an interesting decision given that an actual courtroom only appears in the film for less than 2 minutes; the rest of the film’s 96-minute running time plays out in an increasingly claustrophobic jury deliberation room. But there is no doubting its influence. It was remade as a television film forty years later by acclaimed director William Friedkin starring George C. Scott, Jack Lemmon and James Gandolfini. In fact, it has been repeatedly remade in various languages in various countries around the world, including Germany, Norway, Japan, Russia, France, China and, of course, India, despite the fact that most of these countries do not even have a judicial system that mandates jury trials.

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The Indian version, Ek Ruka Hua Faisla, directed by Basu Chatterjee and starring Pankaj Kapur, M.K. Raina and Annu Kapoor was made in 1986. At a run time of 127 minutes, it is half-an-hour longer than the original, but is a more-or-less faithful translation. And I do mean that quite literally. The jurors have the same personalities and even correspond to the same numbers as in the original. Many of the dialogues are direct Hindustani translations of the original English lines. Even some of the jokes are repeated. The racism and prejudice against Hispanics, immigrants and slum-dwellers displayed by some of the jurors in 12 Angry Men have been cleverly reflected in Ek Ruka Hua Faisla as upper-caste bigotry against minorities and the rising hatred for South Indian immigrants in Bombay that was being fuelled by right-wing groups at the time.

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Scenes from 12 Angry Men (left) and Ek Ruka Hua Faisla (right)

The Jury Is Still Out

But the thing to note here is that by 1986, the jury trial was long dead in India. There is nothing in the film to suggest that it is a period film based in the ‘50s when jury trials still happened, and yet there is no explanation for a jury in this case. In the Chinese adaptation, 12 Citizens (2014), the twelve men are assembled from different walks of life to form a mock jury as part of an experiment in a law school, a set-up that makes sense. As we had discussed in our video on the Nanavati trial earlier this year, the East India Company had introduced the jury trial in India as Englishmen considered it their right to be judged by a jury of their peers. However, even under the British Raj, English lawyers felt that Indians did not make good jurors as they were deemed to be irrational, swayed by superstition and religion and incapable of understanding the English language in which court proceedings were conducted. Various law commission reports suggested the abolition of the jury trial, the final one being the 41st Law Commission Report published in 1969. The Nanavati case is widely regarded as the nail in the coffin of the jury trial, which was done away with in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

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Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (Image from supremecourtofindia.nic.in)

The public prosecutor in the Nanavati trial was Y.V. Chandrachud, who would go on to become the Chief Justice of India. It was during his tenure as Chief Justice that he was a part of the five-judge bench that presided over the landmark case of Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898, in which he and three of his brother judges upheld the validity of the death sentence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The only dissenting voice was that of Justice Bhagwati who felt that the death penalty was unconstitutional. However, the most important aspect of the judgment was the court’s pronouncement that the death penalty should only be given in the “rarest of rare cases”. In Ek Ruka Hua Faisla as in 12 Angry Men, the judge tells the jurors that if they found the accused guilty, he would be automatically sentenced to death. While this certainly raises the stakes in the films and makes the decision far more difficult, one wonders if a boy would be sentenced to death in India for killing his violent, abusive father keeping in mind the fact that there have been only 56 death penalty cases in Maharashtra since 1947. There are other basic inaccuracies that a layman might miss, but are glaring errors for lawyers who are familiar with the jury system. For example, in Ek Ruka Hua Faisla, one of the jurors is shown casually reading a newspaper just before deliberations begin. Anyone who is familiar with jury trials knows that jurors are completely sequestered during the pendency of the trial and are denied access to newspapers, television and any form of mass media in order to keep them absolutely unbiased. Similarly, while I am not an expert in American criminal law, it seemed improper of the judge in 12 Angry Men to tell the jury that a guilty verdict would necessarily attract the death penalty. It is my understanding that once the jury has given its verdict the judge sets a date for sentencing. Before that date, a pre-sentence investigation is carried out to help the judge determine the appropriate sentence. The pre-sentence investigation may consider the defendant’s prior criminal record, background, possible mitigating circumstances of the crime, the likelihood of successful probationary sentence, and suggested programmes for rehabilitation. It seems a little presumptuous of the judge to offer a foregone conclusion to the jurors before any of this has been done.

Flawed Greatness

Official Portrait of Justice Sonia Sotomayor

Official Portrait of Justice Sonia Sotomayor

But ultimately, there is no point in getting hung up on legal inaccuracies in a film, where the aim is to build tension and keep the audience engaged. While all the characters in the films are interesting, arguably the most important character is mostly invisible: the court. And while 12 Angry Men is a great film that had a positive impact on many people, it is not without its flaws. Justice Sotomayor, who counts the film among her major inspirations, admitted that, as a lower-court judge, she referred to it to instruct jurors on how not to carry out their duties. While speaking about the film in Fordham University in 2010, she said: “I would bring up this movie and explain to them that some of the things that happened, shouldn’t have happened. There’s an awful lot of speculation in the film.” The courtroom proceedings in the film are portrayed as a complete shambles. The defence attorney is described as incompetent and uninterested in the case. However, Sotomayor went further and also criticised the unseen prosecutor, stating that the job of the prosecutor is not merely to convict people, but also to investigate thoroughly beforehand to ensure the defendant’s guilt.

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Scenes from 12 Angry Men (left) and Ek Ruka Hua Faisla (right)

Like many other films based on the law, 12 Angry Men is suspicious of the judicial system and reposes more faith in the efforts and ingenuity of one bright individual warrior for the cause of truth. The largely absent courtroom in the film is cast less as a facilitator of justice and more as a hindrance, where lazy, bored and cynical officers of the court do a shoddy job of conducting a trial, subverting the judicial process, making it a farcical exercise. Rather than bringing some clarity to the case, the courtroom manages to mislead all but one man, making it the largest red herring in the history of crime. The twelve men, it would seem, have every right to be angry.

Categories
Litigation

Death and the special legislation – Why the CrPC’s death penalty safeguards should also be available when death is awarded under other laws

ProceduralLawOfTheDeathPenalty_RahulRamanApart from the Indian Penal Code, 1860, there are 23 statutes that prescribe the death penalty as a form of punishment in India. The Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016 is the most recent addition to this list.

The movement towards making the death penalty an exceptional punishment began in 1955, after the repeal of Section 367(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which required courts to record reasons when deciding not to impose the death penalty. Several important substantive and procedural safeguards were then introduced by the legislature and the judiciary to ensure the fair administration of the death penalty.

When safeguards in the CrPC are not available

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC) requires the court in Section 354(3) to record “special reasons” while awarding the death penalty. It also requires the obligatory confirmation of the death sentence by the High Court. There are however, quasi-judicial bodies with the power to award the death penalty, which are bound only by the procedures prescribed in their parent statutes and not the CrPC. Some of these statutes include the Air Force Act, 1950 (“Air Force Act”), the Assam Rifles Act, 2006, the Defence of India Act, 1971, and the Karnataka Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999. These statutes remain bound by the principles of natural justice (S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 1984).

An example of a quasi-judicial proceeding that does not follow the procedures contained in the CrPC is that of “court martial”, provided for in the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, and the Navy Act, 1957. The rules of procedure to be followed during a court martial proceeding are prescribed in the respective statutes itself. These procedures do not provide for safeguards similar to those in the CrPC. For example, there is no statutory onus on the court to provide “special reasons” in a court martial proceeding.

In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, among the other issues before a constitution bench of the Supreme Court, inter-alia, were whether reasons are required to be recorded at the stage of (i) recording of finding and sentence by the court-martial; (ii) confirmation of the findings and sentence of the court-martial; and (iii) consideration of post-confirmation petition.

With respect to the first issue, the Court noted that the court martial is not required to record reasons at the stage of recording of findings and sentence. Similar conclusions were reached regarding the second and third issues as well. While these observations were made in relation to the provisions of the Army Act, these observations would hold true for the other two statutes as well since the procedures for court martial are similar.

Relying on the SK Mukherjeee dicta, the Delhi High Court in Balwinder Singh v. Union of India, 64(1996) DLT 385, decided not to interfere with the findings of court martial on the ground of absence of any ‘special reasons’ but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on other grounds.

The petitioner was charged under Section 69 of the Army Act for committing murder. The general court martial found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to death. This was further confirmed by the Central Government. The petitioner had also exhausted the recourse available to him under Section 164(2) of the Act. Section 164(1) and (2) provide for a remedy against, inter alia, the sentence of a court martial. The aggrieved party can present a petition before the confirming authority, and after that, to the Central Government or the Chief of Army Staff.

The petitioner, therefore, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the above orders, questioning among other things, the absence of “special reasons” in the order of the general court martial, as stipulated under Section 354(3) of the CrPC. The petitioner also raised an argument in the alternative that the requirement under Section 354(3) should be read as a part of natural justice requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution.

The court reiterated the position laid down in SN Mukherjee, and said that the general court martial did not commit any error by not recording any ‘special reasons’ in the case. Similarly, the Court interpreted Section 162 of the Army Act to excuse even the confirming authority from providing reasons while confirming the sentence of death. Regardless, the court observed that if there are any shortcomings in the findings of general court martial or the confirming authority, they could be challenged under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court failed to make any observation on the argument regarding Article 21 of the Constitution; that giving “special reasons” is essential in a case where death sentence is to be awarded irrespective of the nature of the court or tribunal.

Similarly, Section 64 of the Border Security Force Act, 1968 provides for the establishment of special courts. The General Security Force Court is empowered to pass a sentence of death under Section 72. Chapter VII (Sections 82 to 106), which lays down the procedure for the courts under this Act, does not contain any special procedure (as contained in CrPC) with respect to death sentence. The only additional requirement for passing a death sentence is that it should be passed with a concurrence of at least two-third members of the court. Other decisions of the Court can be passed by an absolute majority. This kind of voting requirement is present in other statutes that stipulate for trial by court martial as well.

Most of the other non-IPC legislations that stipulate death penalty among its punishments follow the special procedures mentioned in the CrPC with respect to the death penalty. For example, under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, there is a provision in Section 14 for establishing a special court for trying of offences committed under the Act. However, this court is also bound by the procedures prescribed in the CrPC.

The incorporation of special provisions with respect to the death penalty in the CrPC signifies the legislature’s intent to include additional safeguards that aim at ensuring maximum protection to a person sentenced to death. Considering the general legislative and judicial caution against the death penalty, it is important that a larger bench of the Supreme Court revisit the findings in S.N. Mukherjee. The requirements of giving ‘special reasons’ and obligatory confirmation by the High Court should be made imperative, regardless of the statute under which a person has been sentenced to death.

(Rahul Raman is a Project Associate at the Centre on the Death Penalty, National Law University, Delhi.)

Categories
Litigation

Open court hearings in review petitions after Mohd. Arif (2014)

SohamGoswami_DeathPenaltyProcedureThe Supreme Court of India has qualified the scope and extent of the right to life enshrined in Article 21, through a series of judgments from A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, ensuring that infringements upon life and personal liberty may only be made through “fair, just and reasonable procedure”.

So what of the procedure extinguishing life from a person who has been found guilty of capital offences? There is a comprehensive procedure under Indian law to ensure that a person sentenced to death may be afforded the maximum opportunities to present his side of the case so that he can hopefully be acquitted or his sentence commuted. A Court of Sessions, which is the competent court to record evidence and convict the accused, must cite its reasons in writing (Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) for awarding the death sentence and must then submit that decision to the state’s High Court for confirmation (Section 366). The sentence is considered valid only after confirmation and the convict may (if the High Court certifies the case under Article 134 of the Constitution) move the Supreme Court. The convict has a right of appeal if the High Court has either (a) overturned an acquittal or lesser conviction by the Court of Sessions and awarded the death sentence or (b) withdrawn proceedings before the Court of Sessions and conducted the same in the High Court.

The Supreme Court’s review jurisdiction

Under Article 137 of the Constitution, the Court may review cases decided by them. Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 further require review to be done in chambers (that is, by judges, conferring amongst themselves without the assistance of counsel) and based on written pleadings made by counsel.

The Supreme Court in P.N. Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, AIR 1980 SC 808, upheld the constitutional validity of Order XL, Rule 2 (requiring review in chambers), citing the heavy burden upon the Supreme Court to hear oral arguments in all cases within its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court however, in Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and Others, (2014) 9 SCC 737, dealt with the question of whether death sentence cases would form a class by themselves, meriting separate treatment.

The disagreement in Mohd. Arif

Writing for the majority, Justice Rohinton F. Nariman held that due to the nature of the death penalty, where:

1. the punishment is irreversible, and

2. due to lack of sentencing guidelines, it is left to various judges as to the quantum of sentence to be awarded (for instance, one judge might award the death sentence in a certain case, while another judge might sentence someone to life imprisonment for the same offence and same circumstances), sentencing was often arbitrary;

the highest standard of scrutiny was required in such cases.

Justice Rohinton F. Nariman interpreted Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer’s (the author in P.N. Eswara Iyer) ruling as allowing for such cases to be heard orally in open court. He quotes paragraph 29A of P.N. Eswara Iyer “…indeed, there is no judicial cry for extinguishment of oral argument altogether.”

However, Justice Chelameswar dissented, holding that the question of arbitrary sentencing did not arise as the same judges of the Supreme Court who passed the original judgment were required to sit on the review bench.

However, Mohd. Arif (the lead petitioner) was denied the opportunity to file a review petition himself. This was because he had already submitted a curative petition (the last option in the Supreme Court) and the Court held that to grant him a review petition now would infinitely delay the process. The review petition is filed and admittedor dismissed prior to the curative petition.

Eventually, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on January 19, 2016 allowed Arif to re-open his review petition on the ground that he would be the only person not receiving the benefit of a review petition, which would be unfair to him; further, the dismissal of the curative petition should not preclude the petitioner from receiving the benefit of a review petition in open court, no matter how slim the chance of success may be.

As one can see upon perusal of the judgment in Mohd. Arif, the purpose was to ensure that, no matter how slim, people receiving the death sentence should be given as many opportunities as permissible under the law for evidence to be re-appreciated. However, the problem that is apparent from the dissent of Justice Chelameswar is that ordinarily, the same Bench hearing the original case on merits deals with the review petition (unless any of the judges retire). It is unlikely therefore, that they would change their opinion on whether the convict should receive the death penalty; thus, the purpose of the review petition is not realised.

The purpose of the review bench, as is evident from Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, is to merely check whether there is an error apparent on the face of the record. The composition of the bench should therefore, not matter, as the matter for appraisal should not lead to different conclusions. At the same time, the same judges having already looked into the matter once, would ordinarily not be willing to sit and review the whole case again.
Mohd. Arif is however, a pathbreaking judgment given its implications for prisoners on death row—that at the penultimate stage of proceedings at the Supreme Court, they are entitled to an open court hearing and reappreciation of evidence in their case argued by their lawyer. It remains to be seen, however, the manner in which Supreme Court deals with these petitions.

 

(Soham Goswami, currently in the third year at ILS Law College, Pune, is an intern at the Centre on the Death Penalty. The views expressed in this article are his alone.)

Categories
Litigation

Supervening circumstances and the commutation of a death sentence: A more definitive law from the Supreme Court

ProceduralLawOfTheDeathPenalty_RahulRamanIf the situation that prevailed at the time a sentence of death was delivered has changed, can the Supreme Court take those changed circumstances into account to commute a sentence of death? Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, 2014 (3) SCC 1, looked into whether executing a death sentence notwithstanding the existence of such supervening circumstances would violate among other things, Article 21 of the Constitution. After weighing such circumstances in different petitions, it commuted the penalty of fifteen individuals to life imprisonment and laid down a more definitive law on the Court’s power of commutation.

The petitioners had claimed that the executive, while exercising its power under Articles 72 or 161, did not consider any supervening events. In a few previous decisions such as Triveniben (1989) and Jagdish v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2009), the Court had declared that it had a duty to protect a prisoner’s right to life till his last breath. This provided the Supreme Court with the legal basis to take supervening circumstances into consideration and those pleaded in Shatrughan Chauhan included delay, insanity, solitary confinement, and procedural lapses.

Delay in processing mercy petitions

The question of whether the executive’s delay in processing a mercy petition should be considered a supervening circumstance has troubled the Court for a long time. There is no stipulated time limit within which the executive has to dispose a mercy petition and often, there is inordinate delay.

Earlier, a division bench of the Supreme Court in T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 SC 361, had held that a delay of two years in execution of a sentence after the judgment of the trial court would entitle the prisoner to plead for commutation of his sentence of death to life imprisonment. Soon after however, a three-judge bench in Sher Singh and Others v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 465, held that delay alone could not be a good enough ground for commutation of death sentence, and overruled the two-year delay rule. Nevertheless, this decision acknowledged a prisoner’s right to a fair procedure at all stages – trial, sentencing, and incarceration.

To resolve this apparent conflict, a constitution bench took up this issue in Triveniben v. State of Gujrat, 1988 (4) SCC 574. In a landmark verdict, the Court held that while an undue delay would entitle a punished individual to invoke Article 32, Vatheeswaran’s “two-year delay rule” was not correct.

The Court relied on this decision in Shatrughan Chauhan. It held that while considering the rejection of a clemency petition, the Court could not overlook the pain caused to the convict. Therefore, the Court was well within its judicial power under Article 21 read with Article 32 of the Constitution to hear a convict’s grievance and commute a death sentence to life imprisonment if it is found that that there had been undue, unexplained, and inordinate delay in execution due to the pendency of a mercy petition.

The Court decided not to lay down any compulsory period within which the President has to decide a mercy petition. While the Court would make such a determination on the facts and circumstances of individual cases, it suggested that the executive should itself weigh the aspect of delay while disposing of a mercy petition.

The Court also said that the decision of the Court in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi, 2013 (6) SCC 195, which had disqualified cases under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 from scrutiny on account of delay, was per incuriam. Any person sentenced to death could avail “delay” as a supervening circumstance regardless of the offence and the statute under which he has been convicted. Later, the Supreme Court recognised this finding in Navneet Kaur v. State of NCT of Delhi, Curative Petition (Criminal) No. 88 of 2013 (Supreme Court) to commute Devender Pal Singh Bhullar’s death sentence to life imprisonment.

Insanity or mental illness

The next ground considered by the Court was that of “insanity” or “mental illness” as a supervening circumstance. The Court after referring to several international conventions like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concluded that this was a valid supervening circumstance. It noted that once mental illness of the convicted individual is medically certified, executing him would be in violation of the international convention to which India was a party, and of Article 21 of the Constitution.

Solitary confinement

Despite underlining its own finding in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration and Others, 1978(4) SCC 494, the Supreme Court decided not to interfere on the ground of “solitary confinement” in Shatrughan Chauhan. Later however, the Allahabad High Court in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, 2015(2) ADJ 2015 and the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Pal v. Union of India, 2014(13) SCALE 762 held that “solitary confinement”, along with other factors, was a permissible supervening circumstance to commute death sentence to life imprisonment.

Procedural lapses

The final ground raised was that of “procedural lapses” made by the executive while disposing of mercy petitions. The Court held that the procedures prescribed for the Ministry of Home Affairs were a necessary requirement under Article 21 to treat the death row convicts fairly. It noted that the President should be provided with all the relevant material to assist him in disposing the mercy petitions. The concerned departments cannot give or seek piecemeal information regarding the petition to be decided. However, the scrutiny of a procedural anomaly would be done on a case-to-case basis.

The circumstances raised in Shatrughan Chauhan are not exhaustive. The addition (or removal) of supervening circumstances to this list would depend on the judicial attitudes to reconciling convict’s rights with those of the victim or the society. Further, despite the unambiguous decisions in Triveniben and Shatrughan Chauhan, it is entirely up to the Court to see on an individual basis, how to interpret ‘undue and unexplained’ delay and whether to permit it as a supervening circumstance.

(Rahul Raman is a Project Associate at the Centre on the Death Penalty, National Law University, Delhi.)

Categories
Human Rights Litigation

The High Court as trial court in death penalty confirmation proceedings

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Is a death sentence rendered by a sessions court final? Are there any checks on the powers of a sessions court over such an important decision? Can the High Court call new evidence in a death penalty proceeding? This note is an attempt for more clarity on these questions. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code”) under Section 28(2), directs that a death sentence can be passed only by a sessions judge or an additional sessions judge. Further, the Code ensures that a sentence of death passed by a court of sessions (comprising either the Sessions or the Additional Sessions Judge) shall be subject to confirmation proceedings before the High Court exercising jurisdiction over it. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the death sentence rendered by a sessions court is not final and is subject to the automatic supervision of the relevant High Court.

Sections 366 to 371 of the Code outline the confirmation proceedings before the High Court. In Bachan Singh (1980), the Apex Court noted that these provisions ensure that “the entire evidential material bearing on the innocence as[or] guilt of the accused and the question of sentence must be scrutinised with utmost caution and care by a superior court” considering that the outcome of the case would determine the life of an individual. It is interesting to note that similar confirmation provisions were also found in the old criminal procedure code of 1898 from Sections 374 to 380.

The confirmation process

Once the Sessions Court passes the death sentence, it is bound to refer the proceedings of the case to the High Court under Section 366(1) of the Code. Under Section 366(2) of the Code, a sentence of death cannot be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. As opposed to the 1898 Criminal Code, the 1973 Code includes a provision that authorises the Sessions Court to commit the convicted person to judicial custody (that is, jail). The Supreme Court has clarified in Sunil Batra (1979) that this custody cannot be considered equivalent to an imprisonment. The logic behind the provision is probably that the incentive to evade the legal process for a convicted person (sentenced to death by a sessions court) is very high and therefore the provisions seeks to address scenarios wherein the convict is not available for execution of the sentence.

It has been held in a catena of cases, including in State of Maharsahtra v. Sindhi and Jumman v. State of Punjab, that the confirmation proceedings are a continuation of the trial at the Sessions Court. Support for such an understanding can be derived from the fact that Section 366(1) states that the “proceedings” shall be submitted to the High Court unlike the appellate provisions where the factum of appeal lies in the conviction or acquittal or the enhancement of the sentence (Section 374 read with Section 386). There is however, a fundamental distinction between the confirmation proceedings at the High Court and a trial at the Sessions Court. While the Code, under Section 273, creates a general rule that all evidences taken in the course of the trial shall be taken in the presence of the accused, Section 367 states that the general rule in case of confirmation proceedings is that, unless the High Court feels otherwise, the presence of the convicted person is not required even when new evidence is taken. The Supreme Court has suggested that the presence or the absence of the accused does not make a difference at the confirmation stage since the High Court are duty bound to give the matters its utmost and undivided attention. Here, it is pertinent to mention that under the appellate jurisdiction, the Code in Section 391(3), grants the right to an accused (or his pleader) to be present when additional evidence is taken.

The Code also specifies that the confirmation proceedings should be conducted at least in front of a division bench of the High Court. Should there be any difference of opinion, the matter will be referred to a third judge whose decision will determine the final outcome of the case.

In death penalty cases, the normal practice is that the Sessions Court refers the matter for confirmation to the High Court and additionally, the convict files an appeal on his conviction under Section 374(2) of the Code. According to Section 368, the order of confirmation is not given until the appeal is disposed off by the high court. It is also clarified that there is no obligation on the convict that he must appeal his conviction to the High Court. Even if he does not, the constitutional court is duty bound to re-assess the death case.

Powers of the High Court

As discussed above, the power of a high court in confirmation proceedings is considered to be a continuation of trial. It is well settled that in a reference under the confirmation provision, the High Court has to consider the evidence afresh and arrive at its own independent findings with regard to the guilt of the accused, independent of the views of the Sessions Judge. At the same time, the Supreme Court has also cautioned that the conclusion arrived at by a sessions court cannot be completely overlooked.

Section 368 delineates the powers of a high court during a confirmation proceeding. The High Court can do the following: confirm the death sentence, pass any other sentence, annul the conviction but convict the accused of any other offence, order a new trial on the same or amended charge, and finally may also acquit the person. These powers look similar to the powers of the appellate court under Section 386. However, there are some essential differences between the confirmation and appellate proceedings.

Confirmation proceedings versus appellate proceedings

There are three major differences between the power of the High Court when it is seized of a confirmation proceeding and an appellate proceeding under the Code.

First, the reference to confirmation is automatic whereas appeal proceedings are only brought before the court if the distressed party files an appeal (and has a right to file one). A corollary of this situation is that in a criminal appeal, the court can dismiss the appeal if it decides that there is no ground for interference without examining the entire record. On the contrary, the High Court is duty bound to consider the entire evidence on record while confirming a death sentence.

Second, the confirmation court has a power to order further inquiry or take evidence (itself or by a lower court) without indicating any reason for doing so (under Section367(1)) whereas under Section 391(1), an appellate court has to provide written reasons to justify its act of taking new evidence (itself or by a lower court). Further, Section 391 does not empower the High Court sitting in the criminal appellate side to order further inquiry.

Finally, the appellate court has a certain leeway in not providing elaborate reasons should it agree with the findings of the trial court which is absent in confirmation cases. In confirmation proceedings, as written earlier, the High Court needs to come to an independent finding regarding the guilt of the accused and the sentence.

Special legislations and confirmation proceedings

Section 4(2) of the Code empowers the legislature to create separate trial proceedings for offences that are not part of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. There is therefore, a possibility that automatic confirmation proceedings available under the Code could be excluded. The (now repealed) Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 explicitly negated the role of the High Court and provided a direct right to appeal on both facts and law (not confirmation) to the Supreme Court under Section 19. Yakub Memon was hanged under this law and therefore, did not get the benefit of the confirmation proceedings at the High Court. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (also repealed), the Parliament provided a right to appeal to the High Court both “on facts and on law” which was similar to the confirmation proceedings (but not the same). The same model was followed in the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 through the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 under Section 21. In POTA and UAPA, the cases are not automatically referred to the High Court, rather they must be appealed. The major difference lies in the fact that in the special laws, the appellate court only looks at the points raised by the appellant and does not examine the entire record, unlike a confirmation proceedings which operates independently of an appeal. At first glance, this situation is counter intuitive. One expects increased safeguards when special laws provide for prolonged period of police custody and the reversal of the burden of proof but the opposite situation prevails.

(Nishant Gokhale and Lubhyathi Rangarajan are Associates at the Death Penalty Litigation Clinic, National Law University, Delhi. Amrutanshu Dash is a student in his fifth year at the same law school. The Clinic was an intervenor in Yakub Memon’s case. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.)