Category: Supreme Court of India

Categories
Supreme Court of India

The Supreme Court of India – A tip of the hat and much to look forward to in 2014

NoticeAndStayAdityaVerma_SupremeCourtcolumn2014 promises to be a year of transformation for the Supreme Court of India. Far-reaching changes are expected on fundamental issues such as the appointment of judges and the reform of the procedure of the Court. The Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (“GSICC”) is also functional. How effective will it be in tackling sexual harassment at the highest court? Ten sitting judges will retire during the year. What impact will this have on lawyers and litigants?

These themes are expected to dominate discussion about the Supreme Court in 2014.

Appointment of judges

JudicialAppointmentsCommission_Composition.jpgPolitical parties appear to be unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the current ‘collegium’ system, in which judges are appointed by senior judges of the Supreme Court. The proposed Judicial Appointments Commission (“JAC”) will take views from outside the judiciary into account. The outcome of the upcoming general elections is unlikely to affect the broad political support for the proposal.

In a welcome move, the Parliamentary Standing Committee recommended the inclusion the JAC’s composition in the Constitution through an amendment, instead of it being part of a legislation. This reduces the possibility of a parliamentary majority exercising excessive control over the composition of the judiciary. This recommendation has been accepted by the government.

Of course, the standards applied for the selection of judges will be critical in assessing whether the JAC performs better than the collegium. Currently, the only standard stipulated is the ambiguous requirement that the person recommended should be “of ability, integrity and standing in the legal profession”.

Procedural reform

The E-committee of the Supreme Court, headed by Justice Madan Lokur, has initiated a number of steps to rationalise the process of filing and documentation at the Supreme Court. Highlights disclosed at a seminar at the Indian Law Institute late in 2013 include the electronic archiving of documents related to past and current litigation, a court-linked email address for each Advocate-on-Record for official communication with the Registry, and electronic filing of pleadings (‘curing defects’ may be done electronically – goodbye, white correction fluid!). Watch this space for updates on when these changes are formally notified.

Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee

The GSICC was created last year, and has since been chaired by Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai. Part of its mandate is to address complaints of sexual harassment within the “Supreme Court of India precincts”. An internal sub-committee of three members has also been set up, comprising Ms. Indu Malhotra (Senior Advocate), Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao (Senior Advocate), and Ms. Bharti Ali (Co-director, HAQ: Centre for Child Rights).

According to the Annual Report of the GSICC, proceedings are underway in two complaints. Plans are also being made for sensitisation and publicity exercises. The next few months will provide a clearer indication of the GSICC’s efficacy, and whether the parent regulations need strengthening.

Retiring judges and new appointments

WorkSafeAntiSexualHarassment

Ten (out of a maximum capacity of thirty-one) sitting judges are due to retire in 2014, and the office the Chief Justice of India will change hands twice during the year. The date of retirement acts as a kind of deadline for judges — they must deliver any pending judgments by that date. In view of the impending multiple retirements, it is possible that there will be a greater than usual output of judicial opinions in decided cases over the course of the year. New appointments will also be followed with interest, especially if the JAC starts functioning during the year.

And a tip of the hat

Delivering judgments is the most important function of the Supreme Court. No discussion today would be complete without a tip of the hat for the January 21, 2014 judgment in Shatrughan Chauhan and Another v. Union of India and Others, where unreasonable delay in the execution of a death sentence has been held to be in violation of Article 21, and a ground for commutation of the sentence. Apart from the direct impact the judgment has had on the cases of the fifteen writ petitioners before it and on death penalty jurisprudence in particular, the general observation of the Supreme Court that “retribution has no Constitutional value” in India deserves to be applauded wholeheartedly. “Punishment is not payback” should be a value that resonates throughout the criminal justice system.

P.S. Last week, review petitions were dismissed without an oral hearing against the December 11, 2013 judgement in Suresh Kumar Koushal and Another v. NAZ Foundation and Others (analysed previously on this blog here, here, and here). Will Parliament set this right?

(Aditya Verma practices as an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He is an alumnus of NLSIU, Bangalore, and is on the roll of solicitors in England and Wales.)

Categories
Human Rights Supreme Court of India

Koushal — An ADM Jabalpur moment for the Supreme Court

Manish_jimanishThe Supreme Court’s decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation is a disappointing and dangerous failure to fulfil its obligation to uphold the Constitution and protect the fundamental rights of citizens. With shallow and unsatisfactory analysis, seemingly grounded in inexplicable and excessive deference to the legislature, the Court set aside the decision of the Delhi High Court. That decision had read down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in its application to consenting adults, as being in violation of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Locus standi of the respondents

The very premise of the appeals was fragile. The respondents at the Delhi High Court (that is, the State) did not choose to appeal the decision. The point of locus standi of the various individuals who filed the appeal was raised in arguments before the Supreme Court, but the Court did not even consider this issue, despite good precedent existing for it to do so.

Baffling deference to legislative superiority

The judgment adopts an unusually — and, it is submitted, wholly incorrect — deference to legislative superiority, beginning with a warped discussion on the presumption of constitutionality. Strangely, the Supreme Court relies on the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 to suggest that Parliament did not intend to amend Section 377 (Para 32).

The fact that the State had chosen not to appeal, and the submissions of the Attorney General (who argued as amicus curiae that the State did not find any error in the decision) (Para 21), seem to have been conveniently ignored. Why a Court that has stepped into the domain of the legislature and the executive, legislating and enforcing policy on several occasions, showed such reluctance to exercise what is undoubtedly its assigned Constitutional function — that of upholding the Constitution and protecting the fundamental rights of citizens — is beyond baffling.

Setback for the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence

The worst part of the Court’s reasoning is found in Paragraphs 42 and 43. In Paragraph 42, the Court blandly states, “Those who indulge in carnal intercourse in the ordinary course and those who indulge in carnal intercourse against the order of nature constitute different classes…” As to what constitutes the acts in each category, the court gives us no indication whatsoever. The fact that there has to be an intelligible differentia, clearly does not seem to matter to the Court. According to the Court, there exists some classification and that seals the question of any violation of Article 14. The arbitrariness doctrine is not dealt with. The Court does not even bother with Article 15(1) — notwithstanding that the Delhi High Court had made a significant Constitutional point in treating sexual orientation as an “analogous ground” to sex.

More follows in the next paragraph:  “…the High Court overlooked that a miniscule fraction of the country’s population constitute lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders and in last more than 150 years, less than 200 persons have been prosecuted for committing offence under Section 377.” In one fell swoop, the Court demolishes over sixty years of jurisprudence and constitutional values, suggesting that minorities are second-rate citizens, not entitled to any constitutional protection under Part III.

MinorityRights_HumanRights_377

Besides setting a dangerous precedent in terms of taking a majoritarian view in respect of Constitutional protection, the judgment has worrying implications. Another Bench of the Supreme Court has reserved judgment in a writ petition seeking the recognition of transgender rights. It is unclear what impact the decision in Koushal will have on that case. Further, Section 377 is a cognizable offence, and in light of the recent Constitution Bench judgment in Lalita Kumari that made FIR registration mandatory, re-criminalising it opens the door to frightening possibilities of misuse and intimidation (factors that, incidentally, the Court dismissed as irrelevant in Koushal).

The most inexplicable part of the judgment is the reasoning on Article 21. From Paragraphs 45 to 50, the Court devotes considerable space to this, quoting generously from several of its previous judgments. Then, abruptly, it moves on, without any conclusion whatsoever. Whether there was a paragraph that was accidentally deleted, or whether the Court deliberately chose to leave this question hanging, we will probably never know.

The Supreme Court also berates the High Court for its reliance on international and comparative jurisprudence in what it terms “anxiety to protect so-called rights of LGBT persons”. The careless and hurtful wording aside, it is extremely disappointing that the Supreme Court never bothers to substantively engage with the reasoning of the High Court, much of which drew from Indian precedent and the Constituent Assembly Debates while interpreting the Constitution.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta, writing in the Indian Express, termed the decision “morally regressive” and “constitutionally dubious”, stating that it would be “remembered in infamy as one of those decisions that, like Dred Scott, show how liberal democracies can sometimes give rein to a regime of oppression and discrimination under the imprimatur of law”. A press release by LGBT organisations suggested that it was the Supreme Court’s ADM Jabalpur moment of the twenty-first century.

At the time of writing this, efforts to file a review petition against the decision were in progress. Meanwhile, the ruling political coalition was reported to have opposed the order, and an ordinance is apparently being considered to amend Section 377. It will be a sad day indeed for the Supreme Court if it is Parliament that shows greater resolve in protecting fundamental rights and upholding the Constitution.

(Manish is a Researcher at the National Law University, Delhi.)

Categories
Human Rights Supreme Court of India

Section 377 — Supreme Court has failed in its fundamental duty to protect fundamental rights

Today, one day after World Human Rights Day, India’s most progressive and respected institution has stained its proud record of protecting and advancing citizens’ rights — perhaps indelibly.

In 2009, the Delhi High Court in an inspired verdict, that decriminalised homosexuality, had said:

“If there is one constitutional tenet that can be said to be underlying theme of the Indian Constitution, it is that of ‘inclusiveness’. This Court believes that Indian Constitution reflects this value deeply ingrained in Indian society, nurtured over several generations. The inclusiveness that Indian society traditionally displayed, literally in every aspect of life, is manifest in recognising a role in society for everyone. Those perceived by the majority as ‘deviants’ or ‘different’ are not on that score excluded or ostracised.

Where society can display inclusiveness and understanding, such persons can be assured of a life of dignity and non-discrimination. This was the ‘spirit behind the Resolution’ of which Nehru spoke so passionately. In our view, Indian Constitutional law does not permit the statutory criminal law to be held captive by the popular misconceptions of who the LGBTs are. It cannot be forgotten that discrimination is antithesis of equality and that it is the recognition of equality, which will foster the dignity of every individual.”

Today, after a long, convoluted appeals process that stretched over four years, the Supreme Court of India overturned the Delhi High Court’s 2009 judgment, thereby re-criminalising gay relationships. In doing so, the Supreme Court of India stands apart — in disgraced isolation — from the judiciary in every other democracy in the world — including developing countries like South Africa, Nepal, Mexico, and Brazil.

In throwing the ball back to the executive branch, the judges sought to couch their decision in terms of showing constitutional deference for the role of the executive. The Supreme Court however, has never shown hesitation in striking down central and state laws and has been perfectly willing to create laws (mostly good) out of thin air, such as the recent judgment banning criminals from contesting elections. In this particular case, the Indian government’s final submission supported the repeal of Section 377 (that is, supported decriminalisation of gay relationships). This would indicate that the deference to executive authority was a fig leaf — enabling the justices to render a regressive and prejudiced decision without overtly appearing to do so. The news media rightly greeted the ruling with headlines like “SC: Gay sex illegal” and “Gay Sex is a criminal offense rules Supreme Court”. For once, the media’s inability to handle nuance is working in favour of truth.

Section377

While India’s brave community of LGBT activists and their heterosexual allies will continue to fight for equality — one that they will doubtless win in the long run; in the short term, this decision does real damage to the lives of gay people who are out or in the closet. It will expose lesbians and gays to even more harassment and persecution from the police; give fresh institutional cover to discriminatory practices in every aspect of life — housing and employment among others, and could shrink the already rather limited spaces that the LGBT community has carved out for themselves in public life.

Today, the Supreme Court of India has abjectly failed in its fundamental duty to protect the fundamental rights of an individual and of minorities. Here’s hoping Justices Singhvi and Mukhopadhyaya will see the repudiation of their reasoning by the same Supreme Court in their lifetimes.

(Abhay Prasad is a graduate of IIT Bombay and IIM Ahmedabad and a former volunteer editor of Trikone Magazine, the oldest South Asian LGBT magazine in the U.S. His blog is here.)

Categories
Human Rights Supreme Court of India

Supreme Court’s sexual harassment regulations should not be limited to the Court’s precincts

NoticeAndStayAdityaVerma_SupremeCourtcolumn“No woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at the Supreme Court of India precincts”, proclaims Regulation 3 of the Gender Sensitisation & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013 (“the Regulations”). The Supreme Court of India notified the Regulations in exercise of its administrative jurisdiction. They are now in force and apply independent of other laws that may apply, such as the yet-to-be-notified Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013.

SexualHarassmentAtTheWorkplaceMOOC2The Regulations apply to everyone, not just lawyers (although the definition of aggrieved woman does not include “any female who is already governed by the Supreme Court service regulations”). They are significant because they acknowledge that the sexual harassment of women in the professional environment of litigation is a real problem, especially because litigation has traditionally been a heavily male-dominated profession. But do the Regulations go far enough?

The GSICC

A ten-member Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (“the GSICC”), headed by Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai, has been constituted under the Regulations. The GSICC (through an Internal Sub-Committee of three members constituted in relation to any particular complaint) inquires into complaints of sexual harassment. Such inquiries must be completed within ninety days.

JusticeAKGanguly_sexualharassmentallegations.jpgUpon completion of the inquiry, if the complaint is found to be genuine, the GSICC has the power to admonish and also publish such admonition. It can also take other necessary steps to prevent or prohibit future harassment by placing appropriate restrictions on contact between the complainant and the respondent.

Crucially, for deterrence, the GSICC can recommend to the Chief Justice of India, that other orders be passed against the respondent, including orders to debar the respondent’s entry into the Supreme Court precincts up to a maximum of one year. It can also recommend the filing of a criminal complaint and a complaint to a disciplinary authority (such as a bar council). A person aggrieved by an order passed (or not passed) by the GSICC can make a representation to the Chief Justice of India to have it set aside or modified.

Simple and flexible procedure

SupremeCourt_SexualHarassment_Regulations_SupremeCourtofIndiaprecincts.jpgThe standard of proof required for the inquiry procedure is not expressly specified. The inquiry however, has the trappings of civil proceedings with purely civil consequences, which indicates that the normal standard of proof in civil cases would be applicable, that is, the preponderance of probabilities.

The Regulations provide for a relatively simple and flexible procedure for the GSICC and the Internal Sub-Committee. It is appropriate that the GSICC will always be headed by a judge of the Supreme Court as that can ensure consistent adherence to the principles of natural justice and fair play. There may often be an imbalance of power between the complainant and the respondent, which makes it doubly important that the procedure is kept uncomplicated.

While a forensic examination of the Regulations will have to be more detailed, a couple of aspects that may scupper the efficacy of the Regulations in the long term are highlighted below.

Applicability of the Regulations is restricted to the ‘Supreme Court of India precincts’

This is narrower than the concept of ‘workplace’ contemplated under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013 (and also under the guidelines laid down in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan. “Workplace” need not be restricted by a brick-and-mortar interpretation, given that sexual harassment has more to do with the relationship and power dynamic between people than the physical space they occupy.

A more considered approach may have to be taken to identify those categories of persons whose relationship with each other has a relevant nexus with the Supreme Court as a workplace, in order that it is appropriate for the administrative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to extend to their conduct beyond its precincts. An allegation by an intern against a judge of sexual harassment in a hotel room, as a case in point, may well fall outside the purview of the Regulations altogether (See for reference, the amicus petition submitted by Lawyers’ Collective).

Definition of sexual harassment and the scope of the inquiry

In what may be an inadvertent oversight, if a literal interpretation is given to Regulations 2(k)(x) – 2(k)(xiii), the following acts may amount to sexual harassment under the Regulations even if they are noJusticeRanjanaDesai_SupremeCourt_SexualHarrassmentComplaintsCommitteet sexually motivated in any manner:

– ‘implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her legal career’

– ‘implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her legal career’

– ‘implied or explicit threat about her present or future legal career’

– ‘interference [sic] with her work or creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her’

Of course, such acts, if sexually motivated, should fall within the definition of sexual harassment. However, the definition as it currently stands does not require them to be so motivated.

Further, the interpretation of the Regulations vis-à-vis the definition of sexual harassment and the scope of enquiry by the GSICC may also pose problems. For example, sexual harassment can occur via text and electronic messages (Regulation 2(k)(v)). It is difficult to reconcile this with an inquiry whose scope is restricted to sexual harassment ‘at the Supreme Court of India precincts’. It would be impractical to seek proof that such text or electronic messages were either sent from or seen within a particular physical space. Regulation 2(k)(vi) includes ‘stalking or consistently following aggrieved woman in the Supreme Court precincts and outside’, which appears to be incongruous with the geographical limitation otherwise placed on the scope of the complaint or inquiry.

Finally, there may be a day when laws and regulations against sexual harassment will be gender-neutral in all respects.

(Aditya Verma practices as an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He is an alumnus of NLSIU, Bangalore, and is on the roll of solicitors in England and Wales.)

Categories
Supreme Court of India

Medical negligence: Supreme Court rejects rigid formulae, demands nuance in calculating compensation

PrateekAndheriaThe Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr. Balram Prasad and Others v. Dr. KunalSahaand Others, on appeal from a decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, addressed key issues related to the payment of compensation in medical negligence cases.

The brief facts are in this report. Liability per se had already been decided by the Supreme Court in a previous round of litigation in 2009.The Court had then directed the Commission to arrive at a just figure of compensation. This time round, in a 210-page judgment, the Court increased the compensation awarded — from the Rs. 1.55 crore awarded by the Commission to Rs. 6.08 crore, perhaps the largest ever in such a case.

Doctor_HospitalThe Court’s observations on the ‘multiplier method’ are a key takeaway from the judgment. The multiplier method calculates compensation based on the estimated future income of the deceased. It depends on the age of the deceased at the time of death, since it multiplies the estimated figure of annual income by the estimated number of years the deceased would have been earning for. Tracing the history of this method to the concept of no-fault liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Court relied on precedent (para 65) to note first, the need for flexibility in its application generally and the inappropriateness of its strict application in the context of medical negligence where fault has been established (since the method was specifically designed for redressal of no-fault liability claims). After that, the Court re-evaluated the compensation for loss of future income of the deceased. Here, the judgment once again extolled the need for a case-by-case approach, and added a thirty per cent to the projected future earnings to account for possibilities of future advancement and the ‘future potential’ of the deceased.

While substantively, the Court has decided the case based on existing law, three points stand out. Firstly, there is a constant emphasis on flexibility, context, and regard to the overall circumstances and an eschewal of calculation methods based on rigid formulae. Secondly, rather than relying on doctrine alone, the Court adopted a consequentialist approach. It was comfortable ‘getting its hands dirty’ and addressed issues of inflation adjustment, interest from the date of filing the claim, and even adjusting projected income with currency fluctuations. The emphasis appeared to be on an effective decision rather than on precedent and legal rules alone, an attitude that I would think is laudatory, and particularly appropriate for consumer law.

Despite the private law context of the judgment, I believe it serves the policy objective of demanding due care and attention from the medical community. The nuance and attention in the judgment to context and consequence are also notable.

(Prateek Andharia is a final year law student at NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad.)