Month: December 2013

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Human Rights Supreme Court of India

Supreme Court’s sexual harassment regulations should not be limited to the Court’s precincts

NoticeAndStayAdityaVerma_SupremeCourtcolumn“No woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at the Supreme Court of India precincts”, proclaims Regulation 3 of the Gender Sensitisation & Sexual Harassment of Women at the Supreme Court of India (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Regulations, 2013 (“the Regulations”). The Supreme Court of India notified the Regulations in exercise of its administrative jurisdiction. They are now in force and apply independent of other laws that may apply, such as the yet-to-be-notified Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013.

SexualHarassmentAtTheWorkplaceMOOC2The Regulations apply to everyone, not just lawyers (although the definition of aggrieved woman does not include “any female who is already governed by the Supreme Court service regulations”). They are significant because they acknowledge that the sexual harassment of women in the professional environment of litigation is a real problem, especially because litigation has traditionally been a heavily male-dominated profession. But do the Regulations go far enough?

The GSICC

A ten-member Gender Sensitisation and Internal Complaints Committee (“the GSICC”), headed by Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai, has been constituted under the Regulations. The GSICC (through an Internal Sub-Committee of three members constituted in relation to any particular complaint) inquires into complaints of sexual harassment. Such inquiries must be completed within ninety days.

JusticeAKGanguly_sexualharassmentallegations.jpgUpon completion of the inquiry, if the complaint is found to be genuine, the GSICC has the power to admonish and also publish such admonition. It can also take other necessary steps to prevent or prohibit future harassment by placing appropriate restrictions on contact between the complainant and the respondent.

Crucially, for deterrence, the GSICC can recommend to the Chief Justice of India, that other orders be passed against the respondent, including orders to debar the respondent’s entry into the Supreme Court precincts up to a maximum of one year. It can also recommend the filing of a criminal complaint and a complaint to a disciplinary authority (such as a bar council). A person aggrieved by an order passed (or not passed) by the GSICC can make a representation to the Chief Justice of India to have it set aside or modified.

Simple and flexible procedure

SupremeCourt_SexualHarassment_Regulations_SupremeCourtofIndiaprecincts.jpgThe standard of proof required for the inquiry procedure is not expressly specified. The inquiry however, has the trappings of civil proceedings with purely civil consequences, which indicates that the normal standard of proof in civil cases would be applicable, that is, the preponderance of probabilities.

The Regulations provide for a relatively simple and flexible procedure for the GSICC and the Internal Sub-Committee. It is appropriate that the GSICC will always be headed by a judge of the Supreme Court as that can ensure consistent adherence to the principles of natural justice and fair play. There may often be an imbalance of power between the complainant and the respondent, which makes it doubly important that the procedure is kept uncomplicated.

While a forensic examination of the Regulations will have to be more detailed, a couple of aspects that may scupper the efficacy of the Regulations in the long term are highlighted below.

Applicability of the Regulations is restricted to the ‘Supreme Court of India precincts’

This is narrower than the concept of ‘workplace’ contemplated under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013 (and also under the guidelines laid down in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan. “Workplace” need not be restricted by a brick-and-mortar interpretation, given that sexual harassment has more to do with the relationship and power dynamic between people than the physical space they occupy.

A more considered approach may have to be taken to identify those categories of persons whose relationship with each other has a relevant nexus with the Supreme Court as a workplace, in order that it is appropriate for the administrative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to extend to their conduct beyond its precincts. An allegation by an intern against a judge of sexual harassment in a hotel room, as a case in point, may well fall outside the purview of the Regulations altogether (See for reference, the amicus petition submitted by Lawyers’ Collective).

Definition of sexual harassment and the scope of the inquiry

In what may be an inadvertent oversight, if a literal interpretation is given to Regulations 2(k)(x) – 2(k)(xiii), the following acts may amount to sexual harassment under the Regulations even if they are noJusticeRanjanaDesai_SupremeCourt_SexualHarrassmentComplaintsCommitteet sexually motivated in any manner:

– ‘implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her legal career’

– ‘implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her legal career’

– ‘implied or explicit threat about her present or future legal career’

– ‘interference [sic] with her work or creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her’

Of course, such acts, if sexually motivated, should fall within the definition of sexual harassment. However, the definition as it currently stands does not require them to be so motivated.

Further, the interpretation of the Regulations vis-à-vis the definition of sexual harassment and the scope of enquiry by the GSICC may also pose problems. For example, sexual harassment can occur via text and electronic messages (Regulation 2(k)(v)). It is difficult to reconcile this with an inquiry whose scope is restricted to sexual harassment ‘at the Supreme Court of India precincts’. It would be impractical to seek proof that such text or electronic messages were either sent from or seen within a particular physical space. Regulation 2(k)(vi) includes ‘stalking or consistently following aggrieved woman in the Supreme Court precincts and outside’, which appears to be incongruous with the geographical limitation otherwise placed on the scope of the complaint or inquiry.

Finally, there may be a day when laws and regulations against sexual harassment will be gender-neutral in all respects.

(Aditya Verma practices as an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He is an alumnus of NLSIU, Bangalore, and is on the roll of solicitors in England and Wales.)

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NOTA will provide visible data about those we assumed were politically inert

ManuChaturvedi_NOTA_therightnottovoteDespite its incontestability, some fascinating prospects emerge for abstention. Firstly, by providing the abstaining electorate with a legitimate platform to cast such a vote, one would allow — even morally persuade — a huge number of potential electors who do not currently participate in the electoral process, to register their presence. This, one hopes, will have practical implications like reduction in bogus voting.

If that possibility seems a tad utopian, one can be forgiven for thinking that a “None of the Above” (“NOTA”) option will at least allow the electorate to reflect on its own motivations. It gives the electorate the ability to gauge, contrast, and project the quantum of disapproval as against approval.

Consider the context. The 2009 General Elections saw 4707 candidates contesting for 541 declared Lok Sabha seats. 768 of those candidates, that is, more than 16%, had criminal records. Eventually, 150 such candidates won from their respective constituencies and are now Parliamentarians, thus marking a conversion rate of around 20% for candidates with criminal records. 300 million voters stayed at home.

There is no way to know how many abstained out of genuine disapproval and how many stayed away due to other reasons. There is no way to know if tainted candidates would have secured as many votes from an electorate incentivised by a right to formally abstain. There is no way to know if abstentions provide any incentive at all. With no scope for empiricism, attempts to address these issues are confined to speculation. Now however, visible results will replace speculation. Interesting data will become available for the negligible expense of adding the NOTA option to EVMs. This in itself is quite an achievement.

The idea of incentives and electoral margins takes us to the related issue of NOTA as a vote katua. Vote katua, in the parlance of central Indian politics, refers to ostensibly insignificant candidates and political parties who do not enjoy enough popular support to garner a majority vote to win a seat; but are popular enough to prompt vote migrations from other candidates’ vote-banks into their own. In turn, these vote-migrations translate into percentage losses and corresponding gains for all candidates in the fray for election, significantly impacting the outcome.

2009GeneralElections_CandidatesWIthCriminalRecords.jpgUndecided voters aside, whether some or all candidates lose a portion of votes to the vote katua or are able to insulate their votebank from its influence depends upon the vote katua’s ability to incentivise voters to make the switch. Astute candidates usually counter such persuasions by tailoring their candidacy suitably through measures such as incorporating the vote katua’s agenda to blur the distinction between them.

Traditionally of course, vote katuas come in all shapes and sizes. Most are not averse to partisanship and political opportunism; they too indulge in gimmickry and fantastic rhetoric while prioritising short-term electoral gain. The resultant tweaks that they effect in the political discourse therefore, can be as banal and trifling as any.

But the “NOTA” candidacy is a unique vote katua paradigm precisely because it is incontestable and politically inert. It is not swayed by vote-bank sentiments and its appeal does not lie in making arresting promises or meeting an elector’s expectations. Conversely, it lies in the perceived inability of all other candidates (including the “lesser evil”) to honour the expectations of an elector whose faith has all but eroded. In other words, it serves as a reservoir of disapproval or distrust of all candidates. Every vote it garners is evidence of an elector who is not as much disenchanted by the democratic process as she is by its leading agents.

IndelibleInk_IndianvoterSeen in this light, political parties will find it a relatively novel, if not tougher, task to reclaim votes deposited under the NOTA candidacy. It will require political innovation that transcends the usual politics practised on fractured vote-banks by most parties, partly in the shared hope that attention will be deflected from pertinent issues of governance, and that electoral expectations will gradually decline amidst a barrage of illusory exchanges and carpet-bagging. Parrying the NOTA threat, one feels, will require greater attention to satisfying the abstaining elector’s expectations — whatever they might be.

Of course, political deference to electoral margins notwithstanding, there is no gainsaying that some political parties might still abandon the inconvenient pursuit of an abstaining electorate and fail to view NOTA electors as a reclaimable vote bank. Equally, there is nothing to stop our politicians and electors from drowning the voice of the abstentious in the obscure music that accompanies their politics. Others might rightly argue that I am waxing lyrical about an incontestable NOTA candidacy that comes without the electoral incentives that are necessary to attract voters. Still more adept analysts will suggest that the Supreme Court stopped well short or trudged too far down the measured path of judicial engagement.

To conclude however, broadening the spectrum of electoral expressions to allow formal abstentions is significant even if it simply helps consolidate an incontestable position. This is so because formalising abstentions makes the politics of those (few?) who have been assumed up until now to be politically inert, somewhat visible, collectivised, and amenable to new interpretations. Leaving comparatives aside, the fact that collating this data entails almost no additional expense significantly weakens any argument patently against its inclusion. All in all, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the desire of democratic actors to remain perceptibly relevant in their electoral capacity and give it some form.

(Manu Chaturvedi (manuchaturvedi@gmail.com) practices law at the Supreme Court of India.)

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NOTA — Negative or neutral?

ManuChaturvedi_NOTA_therightnottovoteThroughout its verdict in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, the Supreme Court’s sporadic and interchangeable use of the terms “negative vote” and “neutral vote” to describe the electoral right not to vote, muddied the status of the “None of the Above” (“NOTA”) candidacy.

After all, if there is an electoral right to cast a “negative” vote, a contestable NOTA candidacy would naturally follow. This means that in constituencies where the NOTA candidacy garners a majority vote, all candidates would stand rejected and a re-election would be necessary. On the other hand, if the right is “limited” to a “neutral” vote, the NOTA candidacy would just be a reservoir of abstentions that will not affect the election result.

To add to the interpreter’s maladies, the judgment concludes with an inspiring yet mystifying observation — “…when the political parties will realize that a large number of people are expressing their disapproval with the candidates being put up by them, gradually there will be a systemic change and the political parties will be forced to accept the will of the people and field candidates who are known for their integrity.” Can this be characterised as yet another rhetorical flourish or a gamely attempt to posit the NOTA candidacy as a contestable one?

Other aspects of the judgment however, suggest that the right not to vote has been understood by the Supreme Court as a limited right to cast a valid yet incontestable vote of abstention. For instance, the Supreme Court illustrates its argument in favour of the right not to vote by drawing on the provision of abstentions in the voting mechanism adopted by legislative assemblies. The Court points out that rather than disallowing an abstaining legislator from casting a vote at all (as in the case of voters participating in constituency-based elections), the voting process recognises her right to positively assert an intention to abstain and allows her to cast a valid vote which is, well, innately incontestable.

Importantly, the Supreme Court employs abstention as the intended analogy to the right not to vote, while giving a go-by to the “no” or “negative” vote, even though this option is also available to legislators.

SupremeCourt_NOTA_rhetoricalflourish.jpgSecondly, while directing that a NOTA button be provided in EVMs, the Court observes that such a step is necessary since: “A voter may refrain from voting at an election for several reasons including the reason that he does not consider any of the candidates in the field worthy of his vote. One of the ways of such expression may be to abstain from voting, which is not an ideal option for a conscientious and responsible citizen”.

The Supreme Court also stops short of addressing the second prayer of the petitioners — that if more than fifty per cent of the electorate exercise the ‘NOTA’ option, re-elections must be held. Unless this is taken as a sign of misplaced brevity or implied acquiescence, it demonstrates the Supreme Court’s view that the right not to vote is really a right to register abstentions by casting a valid yet incontestable vote.

Even after its judgment, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that it isn’t inclined to take any other view of the matter (or more accurately, to supplement its finding or clarify its position). Last week, a bench headed by the Chief Justice declined to direct the Election Commission to hold re-elections even if the NOTA candidacy garnered a majority of the votes polled. Interestingly, the basis of refusing to issue such directions was not a substantive revaluation or clarification of its own findings in the judgment (discussed above) but a view that such directions would constitute judicial overreach. This insight into the court’s motivations for limiting electoral expression to abstention could well be the subject of yet another debate; but that it has chosen to take a “neutral” view of the electoral right to not vote is clear.

Seen in this light, the right’s scope and impact certainly cannot be equated with a contestable vote to reject candidates and potentially necessitate a re-election: itself a daunting socio-economic prospect. In the present scheme, while the cumulative expression of abstention by the electorate will be compiled, recorded and published by the Election Commission, it will not a have direct bearing on the overall result of the election.

In my next post, I will discuss the impact of formalising abstentions in this manner.

(Manu Chaturvedi (manuchaturvedi@gmail.com) practices law at the Supreme Court of India.)