Categories
Human Rights

Locking up adolescents who commit heinous crimes will not help anyone

Kalpana_PurushothamanI am a counsellor working with juveniles in conflict with law. Most of them are boys and some have committed crimes like rape and murder. These are crimes that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014, which was recently passed by the Lok Sabha, considers ‘heinous’ crimes.

Mohan*, a 17-year-old charged with rape, told me about recurring nightmares of a gang rape he had witnessed. He had been the ‘lookout’ outside the door as four “rowdies” raped a middle-aged woman whose husband owed them money. He had desperately wanted to prove them wrong. Asked to clean up after them, he offered the woman a glass of water. Later, she identified him in the line-up.

Mohan was guilty and he should be punished. But should he be punished with imprisonment that will inevitably expose him to brutal violence and sexual abuse and trigger further anger? Will Mohan reform if he is sent to jail where adult convicts and offenders are most likely to groom him for further crime? Are there alternate and developmentally appropriate correctional methods that actually lead to changes in his behavior and enable solace and a sense of justice to the victim?

Mohan repeatedly told me and demonstrated through his behaviour that he was remorseful and willing to do whatever it took to do this. But we do not have such programs for juveniles in India.

Then there was Joseph*, a 17-year-old with floppy hair and sad eyes. He would sit quietly in a corner and burst into tears when I first met him at an observation home where he was being held. He was charged with the rape of Leena*, a 16-year-old Hindu girl. Medical reports had showed that she was a few weeks pregnant. Joseph had been apprehended while trying to board an inter-state bus with her, two days after she had gone missing from her house. After working with Joseph, a different story emerged.

Joseph had known Leena for the two years and they were in love with each other. A year previously, Leena’s father, who had seen them together on Joseph’s bike, had warned Joseph to stay away from his daughter. A few months later, Leena told Joseph that she was seeing another boy and broke up with him.

They had not met each other since then till three days before his apprehension when Leena turned up at Joseph’s house and told him that she had decided to commit suicide as she was being harassed by her parents. She also told him that she was pregnant by her boyfriend (who was related to her father’s family) and that her parents would kill her if they came to know of it. She asked for his help in aborting the child. Joseph stole money from his elder sister and decided to take her to a nearby city, where he was apprehended by the police. Leena’s parents filed a case of rape and kidnapping against Joseph.

In many of the cases of ‘rape’ against juveniles, there has either been consensual sex between the accused and the ‘victim’, or a false case has been filed against the boy (usually by the girl’s parents), especially where the boy and the girl belong to different castes, religions, or strata of society.

16-year-old Sathish* was charged with killing his father in a fit of rage. A chronic alcoholic, his father used to regularly beat his mother, his younger sister, and him. Sathish, despite being academically bright, dropped out of school to work at a local hotel washing dishes. His father’s bouts of drinking and violence continued unabated. One day, Sathish had enough. When his father attacked him, he hit back and slashed his father’s throat with a razor. He was found guilty of murdering his father. Although she had no role in it, his mother was also sent to jail as an accomplice.

Unlike other juveniles who simply languish in the system without intervention or rehabilitative services, Sathish received intensive counseling from me and psychiatric treatment from the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at the National Institutte of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences during his time in the juvenile justice system. With help from an NGO willing to take him in and support his education, he went on to write his 10th Standard exams. Later, he enrolled in an evening college and is slowly but surely trying to reclaim his life. His mother and sister are also receiving counselling and support in piecing their lives together.

While these are examples of some juveniles charged with having committed heinous offences and subsequently found guilty by the Juvenile Justice Board, not every juvenile charged with a heinous offence is actually found guilty. If the JJ Bill 2014 were to become law however, the Juvenile Justice Board would have to make a very arbitrary assessment of the child’s ‘mental and ‘physical capacity to commit the crime’ and decide whether they should be tried under the juvenile justice system or the adult criminal justice system. At present, there is simply no way psychologists or psychiatrists or other experts can make a scientifically sound determination of whether the crime was committed in an ‘adult frame of mind’ or a ‘childish frame of mind’.

Crime and the juvenile mind

Juveniles are certainly capable of committing heinous crimes like rape or murder. What they are often incapable of however, is to resist the peer pressure to indulge in risky behaviour that creates or leads to such situations. Research by neuroscientists and psychologists show that adolescents – especially between the ages of 16 and 18, are highly susceptible to peer influences, have poor impulse control, and their decision-making abilities often fail them in high pressure situations. This is because the part of the brain called the pre-frontal cortex, which is responsible for controlling these aspects – namely impulse control, behaviour regulation, and future orientation – is still in the process of developing.

Also, in my experience, juveniles who commit heinous crimes are very often victims of violence, neglect, emotional deprivation, sexual abuse, broken families, poverty, substance abuse and so on. All of these factors are known to influence and impede healthy brain development. While they do not make their actions right or take away the pain and damage caused to the victims and their families, it provides a certain perspective to understand why and how adolescents who should be in school or college end up committing rape or murder.

Almost every juvenile that I have worked with has expressed remorse and sadness for their actions when they feel safe to do so in a therapeutic environment. Many of them have often spoken of a deep desire to make amends to their victims and their families. A 17-year old charged with murder wanted to give his monthly earnings to the family of his victim as he felt he had deprived the family of an earning member.

My experience has been that juveniles who commit these heinous crimes do not get off lightly. They are traumatised and haunted by their actions and the pain of their victims. Depression, post-traumatic stress, nightmares, psycho-somatic disorders and a host of other mental health problems continue to dog them for years. They are cut off from their families, have to give up their schooling, and are removed from all that they hold dear. To a young person, that is often the harshest punishment one can give. Besides, the conditions at the reformatory institutions – whether Observation Homes, Special Homes, or Places of Safety – are not exactly idyllic. There is nothing ‘special’ about special homes and all these are just euphemisms for prison or prison-like conditions. Physical violence, neglect, sexual abuse and substance abuse are usually rampant. The over-worked, ill-trained and poorly rewarded staff at these institutions are not oriented to care giving or working professionally in a correctional setting for children and adolescents.

Transferring adolescents between the ages of 16 and 18 years to the adult criminal justice system and incarcerating them in adult prisons will only lead to a situation where these youngsters will come out of jail a few years later – thoroughly groomed and trained as career criminals. Instead, investing in strengthening the existing juvenile justice system – where they still have a chance to reform themselves and helping them take responsibility for their actions, teaching them to make amends to their victims and to society in appropriate ways – is the way to help prevent further crime and actually bring about some measure of healing and justice for all concerned. Restorative justice has the potential to bring together the juvenile, the victim, and society in a meaningful way. Some countries are already trying it, with varying and encouraging degrees of success.

Juvenile justice is a complex issue and there are no easy answers that will satisfy all. There is a need to balance the rights and interests of the juvenile, the victim and the society. Debate, discussion and engagement with young adolescents at risk and understanding and addressing their concerns before they commit a crime would be a positive step forward. Shutting them away in prisons afterwards will not help anyone.

Kalpana Purushothaman is a senior Counsellor at the Centre for Child and the Law, National Law School of India University.

*Names and some case details have been changed to protect identity

Categories
Human Rights

New Gujarat terror law creates vague crimes, allows confessions to the police, permits secret trials, gives police immunity

Manish_authorOn March 31, the Gujarat Assembly passed the Gujarat Control of Terror and Organised Crime Bill, 2015 (“the Bill”), which is now awaiting the Governor’s assent. It is modelled on the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (“MCOCA”), a law that was criticised for being draconian, in excessive violation of civil liberties, and with several documented instances of misuse. This bill had previously been passed on two occasions, in 2003 and in 2009. Each time, it was unsuccessfully referred for the President’s assent. Now, the Opposition has abstained from voting on it and has appealed to the Governor to decline assent.

Poor drafting, vague definitions

The Bill is poorly drafted, especially in places where it deviates from MCOCA. Definitions of “continuing unlawful activity”, “organised crime”, and “organised crime syndicate” (Sections 2(1)(d), (e), and (f) respectively) all refer to one another in a circular manner and offer little clarity. The definitions are also vague. “Organised crime” includes “cyber crimes having severe consequences” and “running large scale gambling rackets”. What constitutes “severe consequences” or “large scale” has not been defined. These terms are absent in MCOCA. The Bill also attempts to define “terrorist act” in Section 2(h) through a long-winded, logically inconsistent, and grammatically incorrect sentence that is painfully strung together and offers no useful guidance regarding what exactly constitutes the act in question. A much clearer definition (with the same ingredients) is found in Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967.

The substantive offences are defined in Sections 3 and 4 and are mostly similar to those defined in the MCOCA except for the addition of “terrorist act” in addition to “organised crime”. Besides these acts themselves, conspiracy, abetment, harbour, membership of an organised crime syndicate, and possessing property derived therefrom are all criminalised, with the possibility of life imprisonment (and the death penalty if the organised crime or terrorist act causes death).

Special courts

Sections 5 through 12 deal with special courts and their functioning. The state government, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, is empowered to set up one or more special courts and appoint judges for exclusively trying offences under the Bill. The special courts have the powers of sessions courts but can also take cognisance of offences. Of interest is Section 10, reproduced verbatim from MCOCA, which states that trials before a special court shall have precedence over trials before any other courts, and imposes a de facto stay on all other proceedings for the period of the trial.

Evidentiary rules for intercepted communication and confessions

Section 14 provides for the admissibility of evidence collected through the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communication. This is where the Bill makes a significant departure from MCOCA – while the latter actually provides a procedure for the interception of communications, the Bill does not do so, only making existing intercepts admissible. Therefore, the procedure that will have to be followed will be as laid down in Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules, 1951 and Rule 3 of the IT (Interception, Monitoring and Decryption) Rules, 2009. The unhappiness of the drafting reveals itself in a rather confusing (and possibly unnecessary) non-obstante clause at the beginning of the section, followed by the words “under the provisions of any other law”. Interestingly, the first proviso to the section also requires that the accused be provided with a copy of the order of the authority authorising the interception, ten days prior to the hearing where the intercept is sought to be admitted as evidence. This is partially nullified by the second proviso, which gives the judge the discretion to waive the period of ten days.

Among the most controversial of the Bill’s provisions is Section 16, clause (1) of which makes a confession to a police officer admissible in evidence. This section overrides Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which specifically prohibit the use of statements made to police officers in evidence, in order to protect the rights of the accused by preventing the extraction of confessions under duress or torture by the police. While investigating agencies ordinarily have the option to record statements before a magistrate under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Gujarat bill destroys this delicate balance between the rights of the accused and the powers of the investigative agencies. It opens the door to egregious violations of human rights while extracting confessions from persons detained under its provisions. By means of an eyewash, the Bill provides some ‘safeguards’ in clauses (2) to (4), which are mostly meaningless given that the authority administering them is not independent, but a part of the investigating process. The shallowness of the provision is revealed by clauses (5) and (6), under which both the statement and the person making it are required to be forwarded to a magistrate within 48 hours. In such a circumstance, the statement could well have been recorded by the magistrate. This section appears to be an elaborate ruse for legitimising confessions to the police, and the inhuman machinations that go behind it: under clause (7), an allegation of torture by the person making the confession does not invalidate the confession, but merely prompts a reference to a civil surgeon for a medical examination.

Witness protection and closed trials

Section 17 contains provisions for the protection of witnesses, and is modelled on Section 19 of MCOCA. It empowers the special courts to hold the trial in-camera and take any measures necessary for concealing the identity and address of the witnesses. As part of this power, Clause 3(d) allows the court to make a decision that “it is in the public interest to order that all or any of the proceedings pending before such a Court shall not be published in any manner”. This is an extreme provision which is reminiscent of the attempt at holding a “secret trial” in the UK for terrorist offences, which was rejected by the Court of Appeal on the ground that “open justice” was both an integral part of common law and a means of ensuring public confidence in the legal system. The same considerations regarding open trials apply to India as well: Section 327 of the Criminal Procedure Code mandates that trials be held in open court, with limited exceptions on reporting. In a situation where the Supreme Court has already laid down guidelines for court reporting, the blanket media gag proposed by the Bill is extremely troubling and avoidable.

Procedural safeguards diluted, stricter conditions for bail

Section 20 dilutes several procedural safeguards provided to the accused under the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the lines of MCOCA and UAPA, it increases the time for which a person may be detained in police and judicial custody, pending investigation, to 30 and 180 days respectively. Clause (3) removes the option of anticipatory bail and clause (4) provides for extremely restrictive conditions regarding bail, almost mandating the acquiescence of the public prosecutor. Clause (5) is another controversial provision, which denies bail even if the accused had been released on bail in an offence under any other law on the date of the offence. This clause is based on Section 21(5) of MCOCA, which was held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2008. The Bill therefore deviates from the well-established jurisprudence of bail being a right and jail being the exception. Thus, even if no charges are made out, people detained under the provisions of the Bill will have to languish in jail.

Burden of proof shifted

Section 21 of the Bill, which is identical to Section 22 of MCOCA, is a reverse-onus clause, which shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused in certain circumstances. In doing so, it dispenses with the presumption of innocence of the accused and breaks the “golden thread” of criminal jurisprudence, requiring the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, which originated in common law but has become a settled proposition in Indian criminal jurisprudence as well.

Immunity for state functionaries

Image above is from the website of the All India Radio.

Image above is from the website of the All India Radio.

As a matter of abundant caution, Section 24 of the Bill contains another non-obstante clause giving it overriding effect over all other laws for the time being in force. Section 25 caps off the draconian legislation by granting complete immunity to all state functionaries for any action taken under the provisions of the Bill. This effectively provides impunity to police officers for torture and extra-judicial methods employed in criminal investigations, under the garb of “anti-terror operations”. Thus, even in cases of false prosecutions, like the 2002 Akshardham terror attack, the victims will be left empty handed and without any recourse to justice.

“Tough anti-terror laws” have rarely if ever proven useful at combating terrorism, and usually serve to provide a cover for the incompetence of investigating agencies. A case in point is the aforementioned Akshardham terror attack case, where the Supreme Court came down heavily on the investigating agencies for conducting a shoddy investigation, which led to the framing of innocent persons, while the actual masterminds behind the attack were still at large. Gujarat already has a history of draconian legislation in the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (“PASA”), which authorises preventive detention, and has been heavily criticised for being used to detain activists and protestors. For now, hope rests with the Governor and the President to prevent the new Bill from becoming law. Unfortunately, judicial history shows that the Supreme Court has also been extremely restrained while testing the validity of these laws under the Constitution, with the most draconian provisions being upheld repeatedly. The last of these was MCOCA in 2008, which was upheld (although the challenge was mainly on grounds of legislative competence rather than violation of Article 21). While hope is eternal, the outlook remains bleak if the Bill is assented to.

(Manish is a 2013 graduate of NLSIU, Bangalore and works on issues of access to justice. He is currently based in Ahmedabad.)

Categories
Supreme Court of India

Jaya’s plea before the Supreme Court shines light on appellate courts’ powers

JitenMehraThe Karnataka High Court recently refused to release Jayalalithaa on bail after her conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Sentenced to imprisonment for four years and a fine of Rs. 100 crores, Jayalalithaa was immediately disqualified from the membership of the Tamil Nadu legislature and had to step down as Chief Minister of the state. With the Supreme Court set to hear her plea any day now, let us briefly examine appellate court’s powers of ordering that a sentence or a conviction be suspended pending appeal.

Power to suspend a sentence versus power to suspend the conviction

Pending the disposal of an appeal or a revision, appellate and revisional courts have powers to (i) suspend the execution of a sentence and release the appellant on bail or (ii) suspend the conviction itself and release the appellant on bail. In the case of appellate courts, these powers reside in Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). The important distinction between these powers is that a suspension of the execution the sentence pending an appeal does not erase the conviction or suspend any disqualification that arose from the conviction. A suspension of the conviction on the other hand, has the legal effect of staying any disqualifications under any law because of the  conviction. For example, a person is disqualified from being a member of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a state under Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 if he or she has been convicted and sentenced for any offence for not less than two years. If an appellate court has stayed the conviction under Section 389(1), it has the effect of staying such a disqualification. Not so, if the order merely suspends the execution of the sentence.

Power to suspend conviction – exercise with caution

CM021

The Supreme Court has held that the power to suspend the conviction must be exercised only in exceptional cases where a failure to stay the conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences. In Navjot Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab, the Court held that the person seeking a stay of the conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. A person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction without that. In State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Jaganathan and in K.C. Sareen, the Court has even held that a conviction on a corruption charge against a public servant should not be suspended even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended.

Time taken to hear an appeal – a factor when considering suspension of sentence

In either case, the appellate court has to record reasons in writing. The Supreme Court has noted some of the factors that can be taken into account while dealing with suspension of sentence. In Angana and Another v. State of Rajasthan, for example, Court held that the fact that the appellant did not misuse bail during trial could be considered. The time that it would take to hear and adjudicate an appeal is another factor. In fact, in K.C. Sareen v.  C.B.I, Chandigarh, the Court held that when a court admits an appeal, it should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until the disposal of the appeal, because unless an appeal is heard soon after it is filed, a refusal to do so would render the very appeal otiose. The fact that a person has already undergone a substantial portion of the sentence awarded, either under trial or as a convict must also weigh in favour of the appellant.

It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will release Jayalalitha on bail after suspension of sentence or is impressed enough to order suspension of her conviction as well.

(Jiten Mehra is an advocate practising in Delhi.)

Categories
Human Rights

In the ‘red corridor’, human rights advocates fight misuse of stringent laws

Manish_goodhumanrightslawyeringThe difficulty of being a human rights lawyer is amplified in areas where the State is engaged in conflict with extremists or other organisations. Surendra Gadling is a Nagpur-based advocate who has successfully defended individuals accused of being Naxalites. Earlier this year, he was instrumental in securing the acquittal of Sudhir Dhawale, a Dalit activist and intellectual who was arrested by the police in 2011 for alleged Naxal links. Having dealt with extra-judicial killings and false cases during two decades of practice, he said that a major problem with working in conflict zones is that since their location is predominantly rural or in forested areas, victims of human rights violations face great difficulty in approaching lawyers. He also agrees with the approach advocated by Rajvinder Singh Bains, a human rights advocate he considers a good friend and colleague, of filing criminal complaints against State officials in cases of extra-judicial killings.

Manoranjan Routray, a young advocate practising in Koraput in Orissa, agrees. Many of those alleged Naxals are either poor adivasis or activists and intellectuals who have spoken out against the State, which in retaliation slapped them with the draconian provisions of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (“UAPA”) and other similar laws invoked to ensure that the arrested person does not get bail easily. The police also use Section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961 and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 on a regular basis. He narrated the story of the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (“CMAS”), an organisation of tribals that came together to fight for land and forest rights. On suspicion of a few members having Naxal links, the Government of Odisha banned the entire organisation and began a systematic witch-hunt against its members. Most of those who were picked up or detained in this manner were poor adivasis who had very limited access to legal aid. Mr. Routray was representing some of them. This was only an indicator of the State’s larger effort to silence movements of assertion of identity and resistance by adivasis, who are constantly suspected and accused of supporting the Naxals even in the absence of any clear evidence.

KoraputDistrictAndSessionsCourtOn an earlier visit to Koraput, Mr. Routray had taken me to the district court there, which is a far cry from the swanky interiors of the courts in Delhi and Bangalore. Besides the abysmal infrastructure, the place had a generally depressing feel. The overwhelming presence of armed police personnel created an intimidating atmosphere even for an outsider like me. One can only imagine what undertrials and lawyers would have to go through, visiting this place on a regular basis.

Besides the lack of basic infrastructural facilities, courts in such locations tend to be less inclined to grant bail, when stringent provisions under national security legislations are invoked. Earlier, the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and then the Prevention Of Terrorism Act, 2002 were used for this purpose. After their repeal, the UAPA has been invoked, along with the occasional provision from the Indian Penal Code, 1860 such as Section 124A, which deals with sedition.

Surendra Gadling
Surendra Gadling

Another major issue in conflict zones is that since there are very few lawyers in these areas to deal with the large number of UAPA cases, they are heavily overburdened. The police also file a large number of cases against individuals. Mr. Gadling cited one instance where 101 cases were filed against a single individual and other cases where entire villages have been accused. Consequently, lawyers in this field get several matters on a single day and often have to resort to improvisation and innovation in their arguments across several cases since it is not possible to work on each case in a planned and systematic manner.

The extent to which the law is misused is evident from the fact that in the past ten years, there has only been one conviction in the whole of Vidarbha – that of Vernon Gonsalves in 2013 (which is being appealed in the High Court). The fact that a majority of these cases are false is also illustrated by the fact that there is very little evidence that the prosecution produces at the time of the trial, barring confessional statements of other persons in custody, which usually does not stand up to legal scrutiny. However, by the time an acquittal is secured, the individual has already spent a considerable amount of time in jail, which leaves him demoralised. Thus, the law is used to terrorise and intimidate not just activists working in the field, but also people who might be interested in and sympathetic to the cause. Likewise, lawyers and activists are often subject to direct or indirect intimidation and threats by the police. While neither Mr. Galding nor Mr. Routray had been directly threatened, they admitted that they were very often working in an atmosphere of great tension and pressure. The police have made general statements warning lawyers and made indirect threats through their clients.

(From left to right) Soni Sori, Sudhir Dhawale, Binayak Sen - victims of police excesses in the red corridor.
(From left to right) Soni Sori, Sudhir Dhawale, Binayak Sen – victims of police excesses in the red corridor.

Both Mr. Gadling and Mr. Routray, who are practising in the towns they grew up in, said that their entry into human rights lawyering was motivated by their activism during their student days, during which they became aware of pressing socio-political issues around them. Mr. Routray also cites as an inspiration, the mentorship he received from his senior, Nihar Ranjan Patnaik, an experienced advocate who also led the local bar association. While it is important to try and be self-financed, financial support is also available in the form of donations from well-wishers towards individual cases, as well as through informal networks with organisations like ActionAid which work in these areas.

In situations like these, where one is constantly under threat, solidarity is critical. There is an informal network of lawyers working in these conflict zones, particularly Vidarbha, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and southern Madhya Pradesh. This network is often called on to help in situations where the same individual is charged with offences in two or more states, which is often the case, given that the so-called ‘red corridor’ extends across state boundaries, as do police efforts against it. There are also a few senior advocates in some high courts and the Supreme Court who maintain contact and provide help when required. Indeed, the role of the advocate in conflict zones is more political than legal. It is a statement against the State’s attempt at silencing dissent and more lawyers need to take up cases in these areas.

(Manish is a legal researcher based in Ahmedabad.)

Categories
Human Rights Supreme Court of India

Where process is punishment: Supreme Court shows how additional police powers in terror laws encourage injustice

ShadanFarasat_SupremeCourtofIndiaOn July 18, the Supreme Court delivered a judgment releasing from custody, twelve men who had been accused of orchestrating the blasts in Surat in 1993. Justices T.S. Thakur and C. Nagappan delivered the decision titled Hussain Ghadialy and Others v. State of Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No. 92 of 2009. The judgment itself does not point out the period for which the accused had been incarcerated. Given that the blasts happened over twenty-one years ago, it would be reasonable to presume that the accused had spent over fifteen years in custody for an offence that the Supreme Court has now determined they did not commit.

SupremeCourtJusticesThakurandNagappan
Justices Thakur and Nagappan of the Supreme Court of India.

Speaking for the Court, Justice T.S. Thakur held that the under Section 20A of the now-lapsed Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act, 1987 (“TADA”), the approval of the District Superintendent of Police was necessary before any information about the commission of an offence under the provisions of TADA can be recorded. In this case, no such permission was obtained. All proceedings under TADA therefore, stood vitiated. The only evidence against the accused was their confessions before the police, which could be admitted as evidence under Section 15 of TADA. Since the provisions of TADA were not applicable however, the convictions could not be sustained without independent evidence.

In another recent judgment, that of A.S. Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No. 2295-96 of 2010, delivered on May 16, another bench of the Supreme Court released on very similar grounds, the accused under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (“POTA”). In this case too, the police force involved was the  Gujarat Police and the Court passed severe strictures against them.

LawSchoolInductionThese two cases really highlight the severe damage caused by the provisions of these draconian laws. Far from making the apprehension and conviction of actual terrorists more credible, these provisions gave the police another tool to frame innocent individuals only to show that the case has been solved, even as the actual perpetrators of such violence remain un-apprehended.

The more recent case before the Supreme Court was one of the many where the sole basis for conviction in a TADA case was the confession before the police. Under the normal criminal law, such confessions are inadmissible as evidence. In most of these cases, the designated TADA courts have given too much leeway to the prosecution and convicted the accused only on the basis of a confession before the police, even though there were serious irregularities in the initiation of proceedings under TADA or in the recording of the confessions, which are very often fabricated. Under TADA, the first and only appeal lies to the Supreme Court. By the time the Supreme Court finally corrects these errors and acquits the accused, more than a decade has passed. The process itself becomes the punishment.

While TADA itself has been repealed, many of the questionable convictions made under this law are still pending appeal before the Supreme Court. Even if the accused are released in these appeals, given the absence of jurisprudence in India over compensation for wrongful or malicious prosecution, they are usually not granted any compensation for the crucial years of their life that they spent in custody. After the years of incarceration, most of the accused are just happy to be out of jail and reunite with their families.

policeindiaThis experience with TADA and POTA shows that draconian provisions giving additional powers to the police, especially in relation to the admissibility of evidence is, in the absence of genuine police reform, likely to encourage an already compromised police force to misuse them to frame innocent civilians while the real perpetrators roam free. The solution lies in having a more professional and uncompromised police force that is able to honestly investigate and solve both regular crimes and terrorism cases alike.

Shadan Farasat is an Advocate-on-Record at the Supreme Court of India.