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Always specify the law governing the arbitration agreement

SindhuSivakumar_DraftingForArbitrationI had referred to the Sulamerica decision a couple of weeks ago in the context of inconsistency in drafting arbitration agreements. There, the contract in question contained both an exclusive jurisdiction clause (to the courts in Brazil) as well as arbitration clauses referring disputes to arbitration in London. While the inconsistency issue was resolved (in favour of the arbitration agreement) in the High Court itself, the Court of Appeal had to be brought in to decide another critical question — what was the proper law of the arbitration agreement in the absence of an express choice by the parties?

Most of us know that as a consequence of the doctrine of separability, the law governing the arbitration agreement need not be the same as either the governing law of the contract or the law of the seat of arbitration. Most of us also know the importance of the law governing the arbitration agreement – it decides issues concerning the scope, validity, and interpretation of the arbitration agreement.

Drafting-and-Reviewing-Comm-Contracts-Ad-2In spite of its importance however, arbitration clauses rarely specify the law governing the arbitration agreement. Even though they should. This is especially so because courts in different jurisdictions have not been consistent at all on how to decide, in the absence of an express choice made by the parties, which law governs the arbitration agreement.

The governing law (of the contract) approach

Older English decisions had held that in the absence of an express choice made by the parties, the law governing the arbitration clause would follow the governing law of the underlying contract. It was implied, they felt, that the parties intended for their express choice of governing law to also govern the arbitration clause.

Indian decisions also followed this approach (see the Supreme Court’s decision in N.T.P.C. v Singer (1994). Only where the parties did not specify either the governing law of the contract or the law governing the arbitration agreement would a presumption arise that the latter follows the law of the seat of arbitration.

The law of the seat approach

Recent English decisions (such as C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ 1282) however, seem to favour the objective “closest and most real connection” test in deciding the proper law of the arbitration agreement, which invariably leads to the law of the seat of arbitration.

In Sulamerica, the governing law of the insurance policy was Brazilian law while the arbitration was English-seated. The law governing the arbitration agreement was not specified. The High Court, following other recent English decisions, held that the proper law of the arbitration agreement was English law because it had its closest and most real connection with the law of the seat.

This decision was appealed on the ground that the High Court judge should have held that the parties had made an implied choice of Brazilian law as the proper law of the arbitration agreement (following their express choice of Brazilian law as the governing law of the contract).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.  Lord Justice Moore-Bick stated that the proper law was to be determined by undertaking a three-stage enquiry.

The test

ProperLaw_ArbitrationAgreement_LordJusticeMoore-Brick_SulamericaFirst, look into the express choice of the parties, if any. If this did not exist, then the courts should turn to the implied choice of the parties, and if this could not be determined, the courts should determine the system of law with which the arbitration agreement had its “closest and most real connection”.

No implied choice

There was no express party choice in Sulamerica, so Lord Justice Moore-Bick went on to consider the implied choice of the parties. He said that “in the absence of any indication to the contrary”, an express choice of law governing the substantive contract was a strong indication that implied the choice of the same law in relation to the agreement to arbitrate; unless of course “there are other factors present which point to a different conclusion.”

Two important factors in this case indicated that the parties had not impliedly chosen Brazilian law to govern the arbitration agreement. The first was the choice of London as the seat, and second was the fact that a choice of Brazilian law meant that the arbitration agreement was enforceable only with the insured’s consent (which, according to the court, the parties could not have intended!).

Law of the seat has the closest and most real connection to the arbitration agreement

Because there was no express or implied choice of the law governing the arbitration agreement, he then went on to consider which system of law the arbitration agreement had the closest and most real connection. The court determined that the arbitration clause had its closest and most real connection with the law of the seat, that is, English law.

It is interesting to note Lord Justice Moore-Bick’s words in this regard. You may disagree with this assessment, but to me, it almost seems as if once the enquiry proceeds to the third stage, it will be the law of the seat that will almost always have the closest connection to the arbitration agreement.

… No doubt the arbitration agreement has a close and real connection with the contract of which it forms part, but its nature and purpose are very different. In my view an agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration in London, and therefore in accordance with English arbitral law, does not have a close juridical connection with the system of law governing the policy of insurance, whose purpose is unrelated to that of dispute resolution; rather, it has its closest and most real connection with the law of the place where the arbitration is to be held and which will exercise the supporting and supervisory jurisdiction necessary to ensure that the procedure is effective. Its closest and most real connection is with English law. I therefore agree with the judge that the arbitration agreement is governed by English law.”

Lord Neuberger’s observations – back to the High Court’s approach?

In Sulamerica, Lord Neuberger agreed with Lord Justice Moore-Bick’s three-stage enquiry. However, while referring to C v. D, he added the following observations:

….there are a number of cases which support the contention that it is rare for the law of the arbitration to be that of the seat of the arbitration rather than that of the chosen contractual law, as the arbitration clause is part of the contract, but …the most recent authority is a decision of this court which contains clear dicta (albeit obiter) to the opposite effect, on the basis that the arbitration clause is severable from the rest of the contract and plainly has a very close connection with the law of the seat of the arbitration.

Again, you may disagree with this analysis, but it seems to me that he gives precedence to the ‘close connection’ test (over the parties’ implied choice) on the basis of the doctrine of separability (unlike Lord Justice Moore-Bick who resorted to the third step only because there was no implied choice).

Subsequent application of the three-step test

However, it is Lord Justice Moore-Bick’s three-step test that has been applied since Sulamerica. In Arsanovia Ltd v. Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings, [2012] EWHC 3702 (Comm), which involved Indian governing law and an English seat, Justice Andrew Smith (in the High Court) applied the three-step test and concluded that as a matter of contractual interpretation, the parties had demonstrated their mutual Arsanoviacase_arbitrationagreement_Indianlaw.jpgintention that the arbitration agreement be governed by the law of India. Because the judge was able to determine the implied choice of the parties in this case, there was no need to resort to the closest and most real connection test (which, according to him, would have been the law of the seat).

It will be interesting to see how Indian courts apply these decisions. The recent English decisions do not give a whole lot of certainty as to the principles that should be followed in determining the proper law of the arbitration agreement, and it will be interesting to see if Indian courts adopt the C v. D — Lord Neuberger reasoning and give precedence to the law of the seat, Lord Justice Moore-Bick’s three step test, or come up with a completely different line of reasoning.

In any case, the drafting lesson here is clear – specify the law governing the arbitration agreement. With the uncertainty on the law in this area, it seems safest to think about and solve the problem at the drafting stage itself.

(Sindhu Sivakumar is part of the faculty on myLaw.net.)

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When the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is in conflict with the Presidential oath

KhageshGautamWhat do the President of India, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, the Chief Election Commissioner of India, and judges of the Supreme Court of India have in common? They are all high constitutional functionaries at the central level of the government. They can only be removed from office by impeachment.

Only the President however, is elected. The rest of them are appointed by the President acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The President is (indirectly) elected by a collegium consisting of the members of the Parliament and the members of the State Legislatures. Indeed, among elected representatives, the President’s is the only tenure that is constitutionally guaranteed, no matter what happens in the Parliament.

The President of India, Pranab Mukherjee (right) with the Prime Minister of India,  Manmohan Singh (left).
The President of India, Pranab Mukherjee (right) with the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh (left). Image is from the Press Information Bureau.

Also unlike the President, the rest have clearly defined constitutional compartments within which they can function. They are not bound by the Cabinet and are truly independent high constitutional functionaries. This has been demonstrated by the people who have held these offices in past.

So the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, the Chief Election Commissioner of India, and Supreme Court judges are not elected to office and can only be removed by the tedious process of impeachment. Why then has the elected President been denied a clear constitutional compartment in which he can act freely?

Preserve. Protect. Defend.

Among the Cabinet, the Parliament, and the President, only the President is sworn to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. Like a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament swears to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution. In addition to taking an M.P.’s oath, a Cabinet minister takes an oath of secrecy. It stands to reason then that the Cabinet, which has sworn to work within the four corners of the Constitution, would never tender any advice to the President, the acceptance of which will place the President in violation of the Presidential oath. If such advice were tendered however, would the President have the constitutional authority to reject it outright and discharge the duties of the high constitutional office in contradiction to the advice tendered by the Cabinet? Further, who decides whether the advice tendered would force the President to act in violation of the Presidential oath?

A reversal of roles

B.R. Ambedkar (left) with the first President of India, Rajendra Prasad.
B.R. Ambedkar (left) with the first President of India, Rajendra Prasad.

B.R. Ambedkar in fact, said that it would be permissible on occasion for the Cabinet and Presidential roles to be reversed. The text of the originally adopted “Presidential Aid and Advice Clause” (Article 74) said, “There shall be a Council of Minsters with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advice the President.” While this provision was being drafted, Dr. Rajendra Prasad asked Dr. Ambedkar, “Where is the provision in the Draft Constitution which binds the President to act in accordance with the advice of the Ministers?” There was in fact no provision in the Draft Constitution to this effect and Dr. Ambedkar said, “…there is a provision in the Instruments of Instructions.” The Instruments of Instructions were removed from the Draft Constitution when it was adopted. But speaking on the text of the originally enacted Article 74, Dr. Ambedkar said, “It is the Prime Minister’s business, with the support of Ministers, to rule the country and the President may be permitted now and then to aid and advice the Council of Ministers.” Perhaps Dr. Ambedkar had the foresight to predict the impossible situation the President would find himself in where accepting the Cabinet’s advice would force him to act in violation of his oath.

Governor’s power to overrule the State Cabinet

In fact Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, in his concurrence in Shamsher Singh v. Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831, a seven-judge bench decision, cited the views of Dr. Ambedkar to support his conclusion that, “…the President and Governor, custodians of all executive and other powers under various Articles, shall, by virtue of these provisions, exercise their formal Constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers save in a few well-known exceptional situations.” This view was later used to support the conclusions in M.P. Special Police Establishment.

In M. P. Special Police Establishment, (2004) 8 SCC 788, a unanimous five-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that in exceptional circumstances, the Governor of a State, whose office is considered structurally equivalent to that of the President of India, would have the constitutional authority to act in his personal discretion. Such a situation would arise when the State Cabinet is not in a position to tender unbiased or impartial advice to the Governor. Clearly, the Supreme Court was also not oblivious to a situation where acceptance of the State Cabinet’s advice would place the Governor in violation of the Gubernatorial oath, which incidentally also is, to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. When the Governor granted the sanction for prosecution of the members of the Cabinet, which was denied by the Cabinet in the face of sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court upheld the Governor’s action as constitutionally valid and rejected the argument that the Governor could not have overruled the State Cabinet. The Court however, cautioned that this should be done only in exceptional circumstances.

Note here that the Governor is the other high constitutional functionary that is not elected. The Governor is appointed by the President and serves at his pleasure. Which begs the question once again — how is it possible that a non-elected high constitutional functionary, the head of a State of the Indian Union, has been granted constitutional authority to, in rare circumstances, overrule the State Cabinet, but the office of the President, who is the head of the Indian Union itself, has been denied similar constitutional authority?

In Rao v. Gandhi, (1971) 2 SCC 63, the Supreme Court, while interpreting the originally enacted Article 74, held that the President is bound by the advice of the Union Cabinet. Later by the infamous Forty-Second Amendment, Article 74 was amended to read, “There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advice the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice.” One wonders what the point of amendment was when the Court had already interpreted Article 74 in favour of the Cabinet. Anyway, in Rao v. Gandhi, the unanimous five-judge bench was not faced with the question of what the President could do if in his opinion the advice tendered by the Cabinet is unconstitutional. Later, by the Forty-fourth Amendment, Article 74 was amended once again and a proviso was added which said, “Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration.” This proviso admits the possibility of the Cabinet’s advice being rejected by the President but not if tendered again.

Unconstitutional advice

However, if the President rejects the Cabinet’s advice for the first time on the grounds of it being unconstitutional, merely tendering the same advice again would not cure the vice of unconstitutionality. For the purposes of this proviso therefore, it cannot be said that an advice has been constitutionally tendered at all. We must also note that both these amendments came after Kesavananda Bharti and can be judicially reviewed.

Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam (left) with the President of India, Pranab Mukherjee. Image is from the Press Information Bureau.
Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam (left) with the President of India, Pranab Mukherjee. Image is from the Press Information Bureau.

In any event, the President cannot and should not wait for the Supreme Court to give its opinion on the constitutionality of the Cabinet’s advice when in his opinion, accepting it would place him in violation of the constitutional duty to protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution. That truly would be an exceptional circumstance in which the President should be constitutionally allowed the authority to act according to his discretion. With all the legal assistance at his disposal, the President would be just as competent as a Supreme Court judge to decide whether accepting the Cabinet’s advice would force him to act in violation of the Presidential oath.

(Khagesh Gautham has an LL.M. from Columbia Law School and teaches constitutional law at the Jindal Global Law School.)

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Sweet sixty-five

NoticeAndStayAdityaVerma_SupremeCourtcolumnIn the eleven months between December, 2013 and October, 2014, of the thirty Supreme Court judges in office at the moment, eleven will turn sixty-five and retire. Unsurprisingly, due to the staggered increase in the strength of Supreme Court judges from eight to thirty-one since 1950, this is the highest rate of retirement in the history of the institution by number. Even in terms of percentage (approximately thirty-seven), the proportion is among the highest for any equivalent period (including resignations and deaths in office).

Supreme Court judges who will retire between October 2013 and December 2014

These eleven judges currently preside over all but four of the fifteen benches of the Supreme Court.

Following the convention of seniority, we should expect three judges to hold the office of Chief Justice over this period — the incumbent Justice P. Sathasivam, followed by Justice R. M. Lodha, and then by Justice H. L. Dattu.

While their sheer number makes these changes significant, it is difficult to speculate if they will lead to a change in the institutional character or overall judicial policy of the Supreme Court. Even in administrative and procedural aspects of Supreme Court practice, where the Chief Justice has discretion, due to the relatively short terms of the individual office bearers, it is tough to consistently implement new policies over a reasonable period of time and assess results.

If the Judicial Appointments Commission starts to function during this period, it will provide an opportunity to analyse what rules and conventions it creates for itself, and how it follows them.

From the lawyers’ perspective, there will be some uncertainty about the fate of cases listed for final disposal or regular hearing before particular judges, if arguments in such cases are expected to take more than a week or two, for instance. The quick succession of retirements will pose a serious logistical challenge, particularly to ensure that part-heard cases do not have to be re-argued ab initio before a new bench due to unforeseen circumstances, and that judges have sufficient time to deliberate and write detailed judgements, where necessary. There may also be cause to be wary of cheeky requests for adjournment not explicitly intended to avoid a case being heard before a particular judge!

One may wonder: why do judges retire? Why at 65? Why do they not have the option of continuing as long as they are physically and mentally fit for the role? In theory, Article 128 of the Constitution provides a mechanism for a retired judge to sit and act as a judge of the Supreme Court. In practice, this provision may just as well not exist.

GeorgeBurns_RetirementAt65

The idea that judges should retire is neither universal nor consistently followed across the world. For instance, appointment to the United States Supreme Court is for the lifetime of the judge (unless a judge resigns or is removed upon impeachment).

ThurgoodMarshall_SCOTUS_die_at_110_lifetime_appointmentA general argument may be raised that not having an age of retirement allows too much power to an individual judge over a long period of time, and, therefore, change is necessary. There may even be a chance that a judge may wish to continue in office without being physically or mentally fit for the role. On the contrary, in India, where the Supreme Court does not sit en banc, the power that an individual judge has, may be limited in practice. The risk of a judge wishing to stay on the bench for the sake of it may be speculative.

In the respective courts of last resort in many other countries, such as the U.K., Australia, and Canada, retirement ages of judges range between seventy and seventy-five. The Justice Venkatachaliah report (2002) recommended sixty-eight as the age of retirement of judges of the Supreme Court of India. The issue of the appropriate age for retirement of judges was discussed at length in the Constituent Assembly Debates as well. Though he eventually agreed with sixty-five in 1949, an excerpt from Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech is a good starting point for the debate:

This business of fixing age-limits in India in the past was, I believe, governed by entirely the service view. The British Government here started various services, the I.C.S. which was almost manned entirely by Britishers and then later on some Indians came in, and other services. The whole conception of Government was something revolving round the interests of the services. No doubt, these services served the country; I do not say anything against that. But, still, the primary consideration was the service and all these rules were framed accordingly.

With regard to judges, and Federal Court Judges especially, we cannot proceed on the lines of the normal administrative services… A young man may be exceedingly good, an old man may be bad. But the point is if an old man has experience and is thoroughly fit, mentally and otherwise, then it is unfortunate and it is a waste from the State’s point of view to push him aside, or force him to be pushed aside, and put in some one in his place who has neither the experience nor the talent, perhaps. We are going to require a fairly large number of High Court Judges. Of course the number of Supreme Court Judges will be rather limited. Nevertheless, there are going to be more and more openings, and the personnel at our disposal is somewhat limited.

Today, if there are more cases than what a thrity-one-strong Supreme Court can decide in a reasonable amount of time, and there are judges who will be of retirement age or older but are able and willing to serve, at the very least, both thrity-one and sweet sixty-five merit a rethink.

(Aditya Verma practices as an Advocate at the Supreme Court of India. He is an alumnus of NLSIU, Bangalore, and is admitted as a solicitor in England and Wales.)