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Human Rights

Transfer system, mental capacity assessment in juvenile justice bill violate equality rights

ArleneManoharan_SwagataRaha_ShrutiRamakrishnan_CCLDisagreement on vital issues of constitutionality did not stop the passage of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014 (“the Bill”) in the Lok Sabha. Apart from the floor of the Parliament, these issues were also raised in submissions to the Parliamentary Standing Committee and in the print and visual media.

In a drastic and regressive move, the Bill proposes the introduction of a transfer system so that children aged between 16 and 18 years and alleged to have committed ‘heinous offences’ can now be tried and sentenced as adults.

The right to equality under Article 14 and the special protection for children under Article 15(3)

By treating adolescents as adults, the proposed system will incorrectly treat two distinct categories equally. This strikes at the very core of Article 14. The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed as part of the Article 14 mandate (See, M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 71 and Joginder Nath v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 511), the principle that injustice arises not only when equals are treated unequally, but also when unequals are treated equally.

This animation, comprised of MRI scans, show changes in the brain between the ages of 5 and 20. Red indicates more grey matter and blue indicates less.

This animation, comprised of MRI scans, shows changes in the brain between the ages of 5 and 20. Red indicates more grey matter and blue indicates less.

Advances in neuroscience show that adolescents are neurobiologically distinct from adults. Even though persons in this age group may ‘know what they are doing is wrong’, they have been shown incontrovertibly to be unable to act on that knowledge and restrain themselves. This is because they underestimate risk, are susceptible to negative influences, and lack foresight.

They are also more amenable to reform and rehabilitative interventions because of the plasticity of their brains. As stated in an amicus brief for the American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the National Association of Social Workers before the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama, juveniles “typically outgrow their antisocial behaviour as the impetuousness and recklessness of youth subside in adulthood”.

The special protection of 16 to 18 year olds, present in the current law and negated by the Bill, is saved by Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which permits special legal provisions for women and children because uniform laws cannot address the particular vulnerability of women and children. The transfer system militates against this goal as well as the overall objective of the Bill to ensure care, protection, and the ultimate rehabilitation of children in conflict with the law.

The constitutional prohibition on procedural arbitrariness under Articles 14 and 21

The Bill requires the Juvenile Justice Board to assess, along with the circumstances in which the heinous offence was allegedly committed, whether the child offender had the physical and mental capability to commit the offence. The latest research indicates that individualised assessments of adolescent mental capacity are not possible. Any suggestion that it can be done would mean “exceeding the limits of science”. (See, Bonnie & Scott, “The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Research and the Law”, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(2) 158–161 (2013), p.161.)

The assessment proposed in the Bill is fraught with errors and arbitrariness and will allow inherent biases to determine which child is transferred to an adult court. The assessment also violates the principle of presumption of innocence as it operates on the assumption that the child has committed the offence.

Procedural arbitrariness is inherent in the assessment of reformation by the Children’s Court

When a juvenile sentenced by the Children’s Court attains the age of 21 years, she or he will be subjected to another assessment to determine whether or not the person has reformed and can make contributions to society.

Already, half the children apprehended for offences come from families with an annual income of less than Rs. 25,000 while only 0.55% of the children apprehended come from families with an annual income of more than Rs. 3,00,000 (See, Crime in India, 2013, Compendium, National Crime Records Bureau (2014), pg 4.) Undoubtedly, the provisions of the Bill will result in class, caste and religion-based targeting of children under the garb of assessing their potential contribution to society and extent of reformation.

Protection against disqualification violates the right to life under Article 21 and the right to equality under Article 14

Maneka Gandhi (right), the Union Minister for Women and Child Development introduced the Bill in the Lok Sabha. Shashi Tharoor spoke about the problems with treating 16-18 year olds as adults.

Maneka Gandhi (right), the Union Minister for Women and Child Development introduced the Bill in the Lok Sabha. Shashi Tharoor spoke about the problems with treating 16-18 year olds as adults.

Children between 16 and 18 years found to be in conflict with the law under Clause 20(1)(i) will incur disqualifications. While all children are protected against disqualification attached to conviction, the Bill deprives children convicted of heinous offences of this protection, thus discriminating among children based on the forum for trial, the offence, and the age.

They will therefore have to declare the conviction while applying for jobs or traveling abroad. The record of conviction will stigmatise them and make their rehabilitation and re-integration impossible.

The right to life entails the right to livelihood as well as a life of dignity. This stands compromised through the retention of the record of conviction and the withdrawal of protection from disqualification. This also means that a finding of ‘reformation’ and the ability to make a positive contribution to society based on another arbitrary assessment proposed under Clause 21 will be rendered meaningless, as the conviction will be held against the child for life.

The Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development also highlighted these constitutional concerns in its Two Hundred Sixty-Fourth Report. In para 3.21, it concluded that, “the existing juvenile system is not only reformative and rehabilitative in nature but also recognises the fact that 16-18 years is an extremely sensitive and critical age requiring greater protection. Hence, there is no need to subject them to different or adult judicial system as it will go against Articles 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution.

Policy consensus based on evidence has to precede law making in a Parliamentary democracy. Examples from western countries that have experimented with the transfer system show that such a policy change will only result in higher costs related to incarceration and the deferred costs of the rage and bitterness that come from life in the adult criminal justice system.

Sending juveniles who allegedly commit ‘serious’ crimes to jail on the pretext of public safety is not in the interest of children, families, or the wider community. Placing adolescents who are at a difficult transitional phase in their lives along with adult criminals will only serve to place these young people at risk of being physically, sexually and emotionally abused and being further criminalised. This regressive outcome is in stark contrast to our constitutional mandate and the rehabilitative aims outlined even in the preamble of this Bill.

Swagata Raha, Arlene Manoharan, and Shruthi Ramakrishnan are from the Centre for Child and the Law, NLSIU Bangalore.

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Human Rights

Wake up and take stock of the failure to implement the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000

ArleneManoharan_SwagataRaha_ShrutiRamakrishnan_CCLFifteen years since it came into force, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is yet to be fully implemented. In 2014, the Justice Verma Committee, which looked into reforms in the criminal justice system, commented on this failure. On

April 17, 2015, in Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, the Supreme Court also noted the poor implementation of this law. “To make matter worse, we have been told that even the Central Government has not constituted the Central Advisory Board despite the Act having been in force for the last 15 years. This is a clear indication of a complete lack of sensitivity and the apathy that the Ministry has for children and also a complete disregard for the law enacted by the Parliament. We expect the Ministry to wake up and take stock of the law enacted by the Parliament.

By 2010, only fourteen states and four Union Territories had Child Welfare Committees and Juvenile Justice Boards set up in all districts. The Parliamentary Standing Committee lamented the “gross failure in the existing juvenile justice system primarily because its provisions, in particular those relating to rehabilitation, vocational training and social reintegration, had not been implemented in letter and spirit”.

In order to address the several petitions that came before them in relation to issues such as the non-establishment of homes and the failure to constitute statutory bodies, various high courts set up committees to monitor implementation. The Supreme Court even set up a one-person committee headed by Justice Madan B. Lokur in August 2013 to ensure the effective implementation of the law.

Reformative scheme of the 2000 Act

The Act provides for a unique multi-disciplinary inquiry into each individual that comes before the Juvenile Justice Board. The Juvenile Justice Board has the power to conduct a comprehensive inquiry to establish guilt, motive, and ascertain the circumstances of the crime.

Social investigation reports will draw from home visits, interviews with teachers, relatives, and experts who have assessed the juvenile. Under the model rules under this Act (“Model Rules”), these reports will form the basis of judicial decisions on bail as well as final orders. Form IV of the Model Rules has to be used for preparing these reports. A closer look at it reveals that the inquiry needs to be a comprehensive one taking into account the child’s past history as well as current personality, character, intelligence, mental health status, economic status, religious views, educational status, social and family circumstances, influences that impact behavior, as well as the circumstances in which the crime was allegedly committed.

The Juvenile Justice Board has to then pass an order drawing from a range of options provided in Section 15, which in their opinion will help reform the child, ensure justice to the victim, and keep the community safe.

The law also demands an individualised approach. While passing such orders, individual care plans have to be prepared for each juvenile.

A juvenile may be housed in a “special home”, which has to mandatorily classify and segregate children, based on age and seriousness of the offence. “Places of safety” will house juveniles who cannot be accommodated along with others in observation homes or special homes. Children who may be mentally ill or addicted to drugs or other psychotropic substances may be transferred to other treatment centres.

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No trained staff to implement the 2000 Act

This legal framework provides a robust and comprehensive framework to enable genuine reform and rehabilitation of children and adolescents with any behavioural or developmental challenges, especially those who may have been found to have committed violent crime. Though there is no empirical research on the functioning of these special homes around the country, the fact that there is no special cadre of correctional counselors and forensic social workers, and no specialised behavior modification programmes, says it all.

Moreover, there is no special cadre of probation officers for children, dedicated to this important vocation. The role of the probation officer is crucial in conducting social investigation reports, monitoring and supervising the child, and providing guidance and mentorship.

In our field experience, we have rarely found functionaries who fit the bill when it comes to this challenging role. Naturally, juveniles do not receive the services they are entitled to. The preparation, implementation, and monitoring of individual care plans need to be given the serious attention they deserve.

It is clear that the reformative scheme envisaged in the Act was never even given an opportunity to demonstrate its potential in addressing juvenile crime. There is no functional assessment or probation and counseling services for juveniles and nothing special or scientific about the special homes mandated to provide special correctional services.

Abysmal allocation

From an already inadequate 4.52 per cent of the total budget in the previous budget, child welfare dropped even further in the list of priorities after the Union Budget for 2015-16. Even though children constitute 39 per cent of India’s total population, allocation towards their welfare is just over 3 per cent. In fact, since the JJ Act came into force, “children have never received more than 5 per cent of the total Union Budget allocation”.

Despite these several claims regarding the failure to implement the JJ Act, the Ministry of Women and Child Development has been quick to suggest that the law had failed to address juvenile crime rate. The state needs to own its responsibility for the failure of the juvenile justice system before considering the radical amendments in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Bill, 2014 will have a far reaching impact on young people and their families.

Swagata Raha, Arlene Manoharan, and Shruthi Ramakrishnan are from the Centre for Child and the Law, NLSIU Bangalore.

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Human Rights

New juvenile justice law cleared by the Lok Sabha violates basic tenets of the Child Rights Convention

ArleneManoharan_SwagataRaha_ShrutiRamakrishnan_CCLOn May 7, in spite of doubts about its compatibility with the Constitution of India and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”), the Lok Sabha passed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014 (“JJ Bill”). While the Bill has some positive provisions, it allows children between the ages of 16 and 18 years, who are alleged to have committed heinous offences, to be transferred to an adult court where they will be tried and sentenced as adults. Heinous offences are those punishable with more than seven years imprisonment.

India’s U-turn

India had ratified the UNCRC in 1992. In February 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) questioned India about the discriminatory nature of the definition of the term ‘juvenile’ under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and recommended that it be amended “to ensure that boys under 18 years are covered by the definition of juvenile, as girls already are”. The legislative intention behind the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, evident from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, was to ensure compliance with children’s right to equality and non-discrimination under the UNCRC. “The justice system as available for adults is not considered suitable for being applied to a juvenile or the child or any one on their behalf including the police, voluntary organizations, social workers, or parents and guardians, throughout the country.” Fifteen years later, the very same Minister of Women and Child Development has defended the treatment of children as adults with a view to deter juvenile crime.

UNCRC does not allow children to be tried and sentenced as adults

Article 2 of the UNCRC requires all state parties to abide by the principle of non-discrimination and ensure that all children in conflict with the law are treated equally. It follows that the disadvantageous treatment of children based on their age and the nature of the offence they allegedly commit would constitute a violation of Article 2.

Through the introduction of a transfer system and a preliminary assessment procedure to determine the capacity of a child to commit the crime prior to the establishment of guilt, the JJ Bill flouts some of the most basic tenets of the UNCRC. The CRC has categorically condemned the treatment of children as adults. It has recommended that:

“… those States parties which limit the applicability of their juvenile justice rules to children under the age of 16 (or lower) years, or which allow by way of exception that 16 or 17-year-old children are treated as adult criminals, change their laws with a view to achieving a non-discriminatory full application of their juvenile justice rules to all persons under the age of 18 years.”

The transfer provisions grossly violate Article 2 of the UNCRC and incorporates punitive goals that have no place in the juvenile justice system envisaged under the UNCRC.

Concerns about public safety cannot trump children’s rights

The age of one of the offenders in the gruesome December 2012 rape in Delhi, was one of the focal points in the protests that followed.

The age of one of the offenders in the gruesome December 2012 rape in Delhi, was one of the focal points in the protests that followed.

The JJ Bill wrongly posits the issue of heinous offences by children as a “conflict” between public safety, justice, and children’s rights. It falsely claims to be in the interest of the safety of victims. The CRC has expressly tackled concerns about public safety in connection with juveniles who commit heinous crimes and emphasised the principles that must underpin the State’s response. “In cases of severe offences by children, measures proportionate to the circumstances of the offender and to the gravity of the offence may be considered, including considerations of the need of public safety and sanctions. In the case of children, such considerations must always be outweighed by the need to safeguard the well-being and the best interests of the child and to promote his/her reintegration.”

This perceived conflict between concerns about public safety and the best interests of juveniles had arisen earlier in the context of trials of children under anti-terror laws. In 2004, in its Concluding Observations on India, the CRC had expressed concern about the prosecution of children by special courts under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 in contravention of Articles 37, 40, and 39 of the UNCRC. In response, India amended the JJ Act in 2006 and introduced Section 1(4), which unequivocally clarified that the juvenile justice law would override all other laws with regard to detention, prosecution, penalty, or sentence and apply to all cases of children in conflict with the law without any exception. The JJ Bill therefore, represents a radical shift in policy within a span of nine years, without any evidence to support it.

Life imprisonment with the possibility of parole offends the right to life, survival and development

The CRC has strongly recommended that State Parties “abolish all forms of life imprisonment for offences committed by persons under the age of 18.”Under Clause 22 of the Bill, life imprisonment with the possibility of release can indeed be imposed on children above 16 years. This goes against the recent normative developments at the international level.

Re-integration objective undermined

According to the Article 40(1) of the UNCRC, all children in conflict with the law must be treated in a manner that is consistent with their sense of dignity and worth and reinforces their respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The treatment must ensure promotion of their reintegration into society. The JJ Bill, 2014 ignores the aims of reintegration and restoration of a child in conflict with the law, by providing for a highly arbitrary determination of their capability to make ‘meaningful contributions’ to society when they reach the age of 21 years. A failure to pass this test would result in an automatic transfer to an adult jail. Even if a child is found to have undergone reformative changes at the end of this assessment process however, she or he will incur the disqualifications attached to the conviction, making it impossible to secure gainful employment or stand for elections. In effect, reintegration would be impossible.

Transfer to an adult jail violates Article 37(c)

The UNCRC expressly requires that all children deprived of their liberty be separated from adults. The CRC has clarified that this separation is not merely technical and “does not mean that a child placed in a facility for children has to be moved to a facility for adults immediately after he/she turns 18.” On June 13, 2014, the CRC’s Concluding Observation on India’s juvenile justice system was that it must ensure “age-appropriate separation of children in Observation and Special Homes and that children in conflict with the law are not detained together with children in need of protection or with adults and that detention conditions are compliant with international standards, including with regard to access to education and health services”.

In gross disregard of Article 37(c) and the Concluding Observation on it, the JJ Bill takes an untenable position on the separation of children from adults, by proposing that the former be transferred to adult prisons if they fail an assessment of their reformation when they complete 21 years of age (Clause20(3)). Such a transfer is incompatible with the clear prohibition on the detention of children with adults under the UNCRC.

Violation of the presumption of innocence under Article 40(2)(b)(i)

Clause 16(1) of the Bill requires the Juvenile Justice Board to assess, along with the circumstances in which the child has allegedly committed the heinous offence, whether he or she had the physical and mental capacity to commit it. This assessment, the basis for transferring a child to the Children’s Court, which is a designated Sessions Court, operates on the assumption that the child has indeed committed the offence and thus violates the cardinal principle of presumption of innocence under Article 40(2)(b)(i). Such arbitrary assessments will invariably prejudice the trial before the Children’s Court.

It is evident from the CRC’s General Comment and Concluding Observations that all other considerations however legitimate they may be, will have to be overridden by what is in the best interests of the child. Concerns about public safety or the gravity of offence cannot be the basis for reenactment of a law that pledges to protect and promote the rights of children by disposing matters in their best interest. In its 264th Report, the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development on The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014 also noted that clauses 15(3), 16(1), 19(3), 20(1), 20(3), 21, and 22 of the Bill constituted distinct violations of the provisions of the UNCRC, 1989 (para 3.29) and recommended their deletion. However, all these provisions have been retained in the Bill passed by the Lok Sabha, which ironically cites the UNCRC in its Preamble.

Swagata Raha, Arlene Manoharan, and Shruthi Ramakrishnan are from the Centre for Child and the Law, NLSIU Bangalore.