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WTO may grant extension to Least Developed Countries to comply with TRIPS

TRIPScompliance_LDCs

June 12, 2013: According to reports, even though most developed countries have opposed it, the WTO has informally decided to extend the deadline for the least developed countries (“LDCs”) to comply with the terms of the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The LDCs had sought more time from the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) to comply with the terms of the TRIPS. Haiti had made the request on behalf of the LDCs in November 2012.

The WTO had originally granted the LDCs time till July 1, 2013 to amend their intellectual property laws, incorporating the minimum standards stated in TRIPS. Further, in relation to pharmaceutical patents, the LDCs had been given time till 2016.

The WTO Council on TRIPS met yesterday to formally decide on this issue and the meeting will continue today. If the extension is granted, the LDCs will have time till July 1, 2021 to comply with the requirements of TRIPS. This extension will not prejudice the right of the LDCs to ask for another extension in relation to pharmaceutical patents.

This is also seen as a victory for many non-governmental organisations such as the joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”) and United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) , which had argued for such an extension.

(Samar Jha is part of the faculty on myLaw.net.)

 

 

To learn more about TRIPS and other major international agreements and conventions on Intellectual Property, check out myLaw.net’s online learning programme on Intellectual Property Law.

 

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History Uncategorized

Pugalenthi v. Ministry of Home Affairs

By Kirthi Jayakumar

The judgment of Chief Justice M.Y. Eqbal and Justice T.S. Sivagnanam of the Madras High Court, in P. Pugalenthi v. The Ministry of Home Affairs, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal, W.P. No. 23141 of 2010 and M.P. No. 1 of 2010, was delivered on September 30, 2010.

The petitioner had filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and prayed for the quashing of an order passed by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal  (“the Tribunal”), on October 6, 2010, that had rejected the petition filed by the petitioner under sub-section 4(3) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“the Act”). The crux of the facts were that the first respondent, namely, the Union of India, had issued a notification dated May 17, 2010 under sub-section 3(1) and the allied proviso to sub-section 3(3) of the Act, in the course of which it declared that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“the LTTE”) was an unlawful association. The petition claimed that the petitioner was a sympathiser of the LTTE and had a right to appear before the Tribunal. It was further contended that the Tribunal was required to adjudicate whether or not there was sufficient cause for declaring the association unlawful. It was contended by the petitioner that the Tribunal was under an obligation to give an opportunity to be heard before declaring a person or association as unlawful under the Act.
The Tribunal rejected the petition filed by the petitioner on the grounds, inter alia, that the tribunal had had occasion to consider the submissions made by other persons, including the political leader Mr. Vaiko, and none of the submissions made by the petitioner transcended the arguments advanced by Mr. Vaiko. The core contentions of the petitioner were that the LTTE itself was not present in India, but that its supporters and sympathisers were. This being a given, it was contended that notices under sub-section 4(2) of the Act should not only have to be sent to the LTTE in Sri Lanka but also to the alleged sympathisers, supporters and agents, all of whom were present in India. It was submitted by the petitioner, that unless the process prescribed under sub-section 4(2) of the Act was completed, the tribunal could not have commenced the actual process of adjudication under sub-section 4(3) of the Act.

The respondents, however, drew the attention of the court to the relevant provisions of the Act, and went on to submit that the tribunal had fully complied with all the requirements under the Act. Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central Government to declare any association to be unlawful through a notification in the official gazette, if the Central Government is of the opinion that such an association has become an unlawful association. Sub-section (2) to section 3 of the Act provides that such notification shall specify the grounds on which it is issued and such other particulars as the Central Government may consider necessary. However, the Central Government is not required to disclose any fact which it considers to be against the public interest. Section 4 of the Act provides that if any association is declared unlawful under section 3, the Central Government shall within thirty days from the date of publication of the notification, refer it to the Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating whether or not there is sufficient cause for declaring the association unlawful. The Tribunal shall then call upon the association affected by notice to show cause and then, after holding an enquiry and adjudicating upon it, either confirm or cancel the said notification.

Section 7 of the Act lays down the provisions with regard to the power of the Central Government to prohibit the use of funds of the unlawful association. According to this section, after the association has been declared unlawful by a notification issued under section 3, the Central Government may issue a prohibitory order for the use of funds of the unlawful association. Sub-section (4) of section 7 gives the right to any person aggrieved by such an order to make an application to the District Judge to establish that the moneys, securities or credits in respect of which prohibitory order has been made, are not being used or are not intended to be used for the purpose of the unlawful association. On receipt of such application, the Court of the District Judge shall decide the question.

Sub-section 8(8) of the Act makes it manifestly clear that any person aggrieved by the notification issued in respect of a place under sub-section 8(1) or by an order made under sub-section (3) of sub-section 8(4) may, within thirty days from the date of the notification or order, make an application to the Court of the District Judge for declaring that the place has not been used for the purpose of unlawful association, and the Court of the District Judge shall decide the same in accordance with law.

The Madras High Court held that the Tribunal had indeed given the petitioner a full opportunity to be heard, and it had, with due reasonableness, rejected the petition, thereby warranting no interference by the High Court. The writ petition was thus dismissed.

Although the case hinges upon an issue pertaining to natural justice, the judgment did not quite look at the merits of the case that were presented before the tribunal. In understanding natural justice, the court has not overreached itself. What natural justice mandates is the grant of an opportunity to be heard, and reasonably so. The Tribunal had, clearly, accorded that in the petitioner’s case. It is very essential that courts work in a way that is friendly to the aim of dispensing speedy justice. In keeping with this, the tribunal refused to hear the contentions of the petitioner, since they were essentially the same as those that were raised on an earlier occasion by Mr. Vaiko. The court cannot encourage the re-iteration of the same subject matter by hearing the very same line of arguments submitted in the context of the same dispute.

Counsel:

For Petitioner: Mr. M. Radhakrishnan

For Respondents: Mr. M. Ravindran, Additional Solicitor General of India; assisted by J.Ravindran,           Assistant Solicitor General

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Supreme Court of India Uncategorized

Loot by lottery

The state of Kerala is brewing with controversy relating to the printing and sale of illegal lotteries. Every story relating to the issue has found its way to the front page of local newspapers and has become the topic of much debate between candidates contesting in the local body elections scheduled for this month.

Rumour has it that when a difference of opinion arose between the two promoters of Bhutan State Lottery – Monica Lottery Distributers and Martin Lottery Distributers, the former shadow-whistle-blew the latter’s irregularities. But as the controversy snowballed with the judgment of Justice P.R. Ramachandara Menon of the Kerala High Court, all interested parties buried the hatchet and fought against the judgment, which had restricted the number of lottery draws permissible in a week, to one.

Image here and on article banner originally published on rowland_rick's photostream on Flickr. Image published under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic License.
Image here and on article banner originally published on rowland_rick’s photostream on Flickr. Image published under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic License.

Apart from rumours, there have been consistent news reports about Megha Lottery (sub-agent of Martin Lottery) printing illegal lottery tickets at Shivakashi and at other private printing presses. The law specifically stipulates that lotteries should be printed only at presses approved by either the Reserve Bank of India or the Indian Bankers’ Council. Taking note of these press reports along with the fact that the government of Bhutan had not renewed the agreement with Martin Lottery, but had appointed Monica Lottery as the new promoter, the state government refused to accept advance tax from Megha Lottery. Payment of advance tax under Section 10 of the Kerala Tax on Paper Lotteries Act, 2005, is an essential condition for the transport of printed lottery tickets into the state of Kerala.

The Congress-led opposition were up in arms against this refusal, since Monica Lottery had been appointed in March 2010, and the government had taken action only in September 2010, implying that Finance Minister, Thomas Issac, had permitted Megha to sell illegal lotteries during the intervening period.

Megha Lottery, faced with indirect prohibition on the sale of lotteries, approached the Kerala High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the government to accept the payment of advance tax. The government objected to the writ petition, contending that Megha was not a ‘Promoter’ of Bhutan State Lottery. The Single Judge (P.R. Ramachandara Menon, J.) of the Kerala High Court, after recording the submission of the government of Bhutan, that Megha was indeed its promoter, allowed the petition in part and directed the Kerala Government to accept advance tax to the extent permissible under sub-section 4(h) and sub-section 4(j) of the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998, which was a Central legislation.

Sub-section 4(h) states that ‘no lottery shall have more than one draw in week’ and sub-section 4(j) states that ‘the number of bumper draws of a lottery shall not be more than six in a calendar year’. The Single Judge, relying on the aforesaid provisions in the 1998 Act, went on to say that the practice of conducting more than one lottery in a week under different schemes and different names was not permitted under the Act. According to the judge, sub-section 4(h) was incorporated in the statute to protect poor and illiterate people, who belong to the lower strata of society from the lure and glitter of becoming rich on a new dawn. The ‘cooling period’ of one week is provided to prevent such people from gambling with their life. Therefore, the promoters of lotteries were directed to furnish a statement showing the details of the draws (under all names or schemes, put together) to be conducted during the succeeding month under sub-section 10(1) of the state Act while remitting advance tax.

This judgment was challenged before the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, both by the Kerala Government as well as by the Megha Lottery Agency. The Division Bench, consisting of Justices Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan and P. Bhavadasan, vacated the direction of the Single Judge restricting the number of lotteries per week. The Division Bench held that the state or its promoter was entitled to organise any number of lotteries and any kind of lotteries. According to the Division Bench, Section 4(h) of the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 did not have any impact on the number of lotteries or schemes the government could organise.

The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held that it was the Central Government that is duty bound to ensure that no provisions of the rule or Act were violated. According to the court, any action against any lottery or promoter had to come from the Centre, although the state was not powerless in informing the Centre about such violations. The High Court also dismissed the appeal filed by the State Government and upheld the finding of the Single Judge that Megha was the promoter of Bhutan Lotteries, and issued a direction to the State Government to accept the advance tax from the promoter without any interest. The court observed that no special contract was required to engage a promoter to distribute the lottery. The court concluded that it was for the State and Union Governments to ensure that there were no violations of the Lotteries’ Regulation Act and other rules “so that vulnerable sections of society are not exploited through the temptations offered by lotteries.”

It requires no special legal dissection to understand that the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court is rendered in blatant violation of statutory provisions. Although the judgment is apparently delivered to protect vulnerable sections of society from the temptations offered by the lotteries, the court has subtly helped the lottery tycoons by nullifying the statutory restriction imposed on the number of lottery draws permissible in a week. The State Government is expected to approach the Supreme Court, which may render finality in this issue.

The main drawback in the legal framework that regulates the conduct of lotteries is the absence of any power for the State Governments. Under the Central Act of 1998, a State government can either declare the entire state as a lottery-free-zone or let all the lotteries reign freely in the state. The reason for such restricted power is that state governments alone were permitted to organise and conduct lotteries and not private individuals. Therefore to prevent any unfair discrimination between competing state governments, the Central Act denied them powers of regulation.

In reality, it is not the state government, but their private promoters under the seal of the government, that are organising and selling lotteries. Although the State of Kerala has devised the mechanism of advance tax to indirectly regulate the conduct of foreign state lotteries and their promoters, the courts have consistently stuck down any positive action regulating their conduct, as the same is within the executive realm of the Central Government.

Therefore, in order to save the poor and ignorant of the society from being cheated through the sale of illegal lotteries, the Central Act of 1998 has to be amended granting appropriate powers to state governments to regulate conduct of lotteries organised by the private promoters.

P. Thomas Geeverghese is an advocate at the Kerala High Court.

The view expressed in this article are personal.

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Direction to limit temporary injunctions in IP matters unwise

By Ajay J.N.

Two decisions of the Supreme Court, both by the same bench comprising Justices Markandey Katju and Asok Kumar Ganguly, recommended limiting the use of interim injunctions in intellectual property rights (“IPR”) matters.

Shree Vardhman Rice and General Mills v. Amar Singh Chawalwala, (2009) 10 SCC 257 pertained to an appeal against an order of the trial court on an interlocutory application for injunction for trademark infringement. The court, while declining to interfere, held:

3. Without going in to the merits of the controversy, we are of the opinion that the matters relating to trademarks, copyrights and patents should be finally decided very expeditiously by the Trial Court instead of merely granting or refusing to grant injunction. Experience shows that in the matters of trademarks, copyrights and patents, litigation is mainly fought between the parties about the temporary injunction and that goes on for years and years and the result is that the suit is hardly decided finally. This is not proper.

4. Proviso (a) to Order XVII Rule 1(2) C.P.C. states that when the hearing of the suit has commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds that, for the exceptional reasons to be recorded by it, the adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day is necessary. The Court should also observe Clauses (b) to (e) of the said proviso.

5. In our opinion, in matters relating to trademarks, copyright and patents the proviso to Order XVII Rule 1(2) C.P.C. should be strictly complied with by all the Courts, and the hearing of the suit in such matters should proceed on day to day basis and the final judgment should be given normally within four months from the date of the filing of the suit.

In Bajaj Auto Limited v. TVS Motor Company Limited, (2009) 9 SCC 797, the same bench, while quoting the decision in the Shree Vardhman Rice and General Mills Case, (supra) observed:

10. In the present case, although arguments were advanced at some length by the learned Counsel for both the parties, we are of the opinion that instead of deciding the case at the interlocutory stage, the suit itself should be disposed of finally at a very early date.

These decisions may seem innocuous, but may prove to be a panacea for defendants in intellectual property matters. In a recent case before the Karnataka High Court, the defendant’s sole contention before the High Court in appeal against the grant of interlocutory injunction was in terms of these Supreme Court decisions; the High Court was not too impressed and dismissed the appeal, but also directed the trial court to dispose of the matter in four months.

On closer examination, the decision in the Shree Vardhman Rice and General Mills Case does not state that temporary injunctions should not be granted in all matters but the implication is that the final disposal should be given importance and not the grant of temporary injunction. More recently, on September 27, 2010, in another matter involving interlocutory injunctions, the Supreme Court refused to entertain the matter and directed the high court to dispose the main matter within nine months. (See, Raymond Limited v. Raymond Pharmaceuticals Ltd., in SLP (Civil) No(s).26610/2010). From these decisions, the philosophy of the Supreme Court appears to be ‘let us not interfere in interlocutory applications in IPR matters’. Let us examine the implication of such an approach.

Temporary injunctions in IPR litigation – A sine-qua-non

If the courts adopt a strategy of not granting a temporary injunction, the impact of such a decision would be enormous and would change the entire nature of intellectual property litigation in India. Temporary injunctions are necessary to protect the plaintiff’s rights during the pendency of the suit, and the impact of non-grant of injunction is enormous. In actions pertaining to passing off or infringement in patents, trademarks, or designs matters, it is very important that the injunction be granted before the defendant can establish a considerable market presence during the pendency of the suit and render the very filing of the suit infructuous. Similarly, in the case of disparaging marks, the damage will be done by the time the suit is decreed. In the case of copyright or a breach of confidence concerning literature, music, cinema or even software, or in matters of piracy, the urgency is tremendous. Once the copyrighted matter is communicated to the public for a long duration, it becomes difficult to minimise the impact. Pirated materials are easily disposable, cannot be accounted for, and the damages cannot be calculated in terms of money.

Under Section 135 (2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court has the discretion to grant ex-parte orders, which would in effect, be taken away by such a decision from the Supreme Court. The various injunctions which can be granted during the pendency of the trial include those for discovery of documents, preservation of infringing goods, documents or other evidence which are related to the subject-matter of the suit and restraining the defendant from disposing of or dealing with his assets in a manner which may adversely affect the plaintiff’s ability to recover damages, costs, or other pecuniary remedies which may finally be awarded. If there is a blanket ban on the grant of interim orders, the conduct of the trial becomes difficult, resulting in unfair prejudice to the plaintiff, and the very purpose of the enactment would be lost.

Very often, the grant or non-grant of temporary injunction results in the matter being settled. The defendant may not want to fight the litigation, and if the plaintiff does not get the injunction, he may want to close the matter immediately.

If an injunction is not granted, then the remedy lies in damages. However, India is yet to develop the concept of award of exemplary damages. The maximum award of damages under the Designs Act, 2000 is Rs.50,000/-. Section 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957, Section 108 of the Patents Act, 1970 and Section 135 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 do not specify the extent of damages which can be claimed, but rather, provide that this is subject to proof. How does one prove damages which cannot be calculated in terms of money? Can one quantify the loss that occurs to a person’s brand due to the fact that someone else has infringed his mark, broken into his market share and probably achieved considerable distinction and reputation in the market?

The decision would also go against the principles of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) as it mandates effective remedies to prevent IPR infringement. The absence of a temporary injunction would definitely mean lesser protection, and an effective remedy is lost to the person who seeks the relief.

Enforcement of the law would suffer. It would encourage parties to ‘take a chance’ and violate intellectual property rights and gamble at the trial. It would provide an incentive to the defendant to adopt dilatory tactics to delay the trial.

A speedy trial in IPR matters – is it a feasible approach?

The decision in Shree Vardhaman mandates that once the hearing of the matter commences, the suit should commence on a day-to-day basis, and that the final judgment should be delivered within 90 days of the filing of the suit.

Apart from the burden on our courts, these instructions are not mindful of a few factors.

Service to the defendant: Once a suit is filed, the suit summons need to be served on the defendant. If there were an ex-parte injunction in operation, in most cases, the defendant would come running to court. If there is no injunction rule in operation, the defendant will avoid summons for as long as possible. This can prolong matters for a few months, if not years.

Time for filing a written statement: Under the Civil Procedure Code (“the CPC”), the defendant has the right to have three months to file a written statement. Further, since the provision is merely directory and not mandatory, the defendant’s right to file a written statement is not lost even after 90 days. (See, Smt. Rani Kusum v. Smt. Kanchan Devi, AIR 2005 SC 3304). If there is no threat of an interlocutory injunction, the defendant can use every trick in the book (read CPC) to delay the inevitable. He can seek time for the inspection of documents, notice to admit documents, file interrogatories, take procedural objections, and file an application to reject the plaint.

Time for framing issues: After pleadings are complete, the court has to draft issues. Typically, the drafting of issues is something which is of the least priority to a court that is struggling with a huge pendency of matters. Even assuming that the court drafts issues within a week of completion of pleadings, both parties have the right to seek the amendment or the striking off of issues, for which interlocutory applications may be filed. No court can legitimately refuse to entertain any such application on the ground that the Supreme Court has stated that the trial should be complete in four months.

Interlocutory applications for discovery and inspection: After the court frames the issues and posts the matter for trial, the parties have to file a list of witnesses and documents. In order to establish their case or defence, the plaintiff or the defendant may require several documents from the opposite party. Obviously, the legitimate objections of the other party will have to be heard. In some cases, commissioners would have to be appointed to seize and take inventory of articles. In some cases, some governmental authority or expert will have to be examined and summons have to be issued to such persons.

Drafting of evidence and conducting trial: The drafting of evidence in contested trial matters and especially in IPR matters, is also quite complicated. If the defendant has denied each and every allegation, proof has to be adduced by documentation. Documents pertaining to the origin of a mark, its distinctiveness and ownership have to be examined. In copyright matters, the origin of copyright and proof of adaptation will have to be established. In patent matters, technical experts will have to be examined. If the defendant has raised questions regarding the validity of a design, copyright or patent, the plaintiff may be required to do considerable homework to dig up documents to prove and establish its case. These cannot be done over a period of a few weeks or months. In some matters, months will be required to prepare evidence and also to cross-examine witnesses. In these circumstances, it is necessary to give parties a fair opportunity to establish their case at trial. Enforcing a near impossible time-line would make it extremely difficult for parties (and to their counsel).

Delivering a judgment: Most judges in India are not specially equipped to handle IPR matters. To impose a strict timeline would only lower the quality of judgments delivered.

Appeals: Order 41 Rule 5 of the CPC says that the appellate court may stay proceedings. A stand may be taken that if there was no injunction granted in the first place, no additional harm will be caused if the execution of the decree is stayed for the duration of the appeal. In fact, even before the appeal is filed and immediately after the judgment is pronounced by the trial court, Order 41 Rule 5 (2) provides that the trial court may itself stay the operation of the decree. If injunctions should not be granted and the suits must be finally disposed of, then would that logic not apply to appellate courts as well?

Recently, Justice Krishna Iyer, while commenting on the Commercial Courts Bill, suggested that India was veering towards speedy justice only for the rich. Similarly, these judgments of the Supreme Court have sought to make a classification for the speedy disposal of all IPR matters. Instead of taking steps to improve judicial administration over all, this ad-hoc method of restricting the grant of temporary injunctions and seeking an early disposal of suits in specific matters is a dangerous precedent.

There have been several IPR cases where the Supreme Court has found a balance of convenience in favour of the defendant and therefore has not interfered and sought final disposal of matters by the trial court. These include cases where the defendants were established businesses, and the Supreme Court declined to make observations on the prima facie case. It was the subjective satisfaction of the court that made the court adopt such a measure. However, in light of the reasons suggested above, it would not be a good idea to adopt the same as a general rule.

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Law Schools Lounge Uncategorized

Interview: Aditya Sudarshan, author of A Nice Quiet Holiday

This interview with Aditya Sudarshan, a multiple gold medallist from N.L.S.I.U., was first published in March 2009, a month after his first novel, A Nice Quiet Holiday, hit the stores.

 

In 2007, Aditya Sudarshan did something pretty unusual for a graduating multiple gold medallist from N.L.S.I.U. He decided to give up the fancy salaries that come with joining some of the top law firms in India and the U.K. and even the option of getting a Masters degree from some the finest Universities in the United Kingdom or the United States. Instead, Aditya took up criminal trial litigation in New Delhi – shuttling between the Tees Hazari and Patiala House courts. Nine months later, he was to make an even more unusual decision – to quit the practice of law to become an author. His first novel, A Nice Quiet Holiday, published by Westland Books, was released last month and is now available at leading bookstores.

A traditional murder mystery, the story follows Justice Harish Shinde who is on holiday in Bhairavgarh – a tranquil little Himalayan town, with his law clerk Anant, and living at the house of Shikhar Pant. Within a few days of their arrival, the tranquillity of the setting is disturbed by violent opposition to the alleged obscenity in a report on AIDS – authored by the Mittals, who are also guests at the same house. Things take a turn for the worse when Pant’s cousin – a noted writer and defender of the report, is found stabbed to death. Anant soon finds himself in the unusual position of being counsel to the Mittals in an obscenity trial, and assistant sleuth to Justice Shinde, as the novel moves towards its startling conclusion.

Aditya Sudarshan has participated in book-readings in New Delhi and Bengaluru. Between figuring out the publication of his second novel and working on his third work – a collection of short stories, he spoke with Rainmaker. On the shift from legal practice to writing, he says the only thing he did consciously was to keep his options open. “As a litigating lawyer, you’re always coming across two fundamental elements of fiction – characters, in the form of your clients, and plots, in the form of their troubles. So your raw material is the same – human drama.”

 
Rainmaker: Most of our readers belong to the Indian legal community. I am sure they would be interested in knowing how a multiple gold-medallist from India’s top institution for legal education decided to take up writing fiction.
Aditya: Yes I guess it is quite a shift. But then there’s no set path to getting into fiction writing anyway. When I was in college, like many people I used to write fiction pieces on the side. At that stage I didn’t think about whether I’d ever be doing it full-time. It was somewhere at the back of my mind, but what I was really considering was a career in litigation. Later I finished this novel, got a contract for it and an idea for another novel, and by then I’d also had nine months experience of litigation. So I was in a position to know which profession suited me better, and that’s when I made the shift. But the whole process was gradual; no single moment of epiphany. The only thing I did do consciously was to keep my options open, and to give myself time to make a decision.

 
Rainmaker: Was that rare in law school – to keep one’s options open?

 

Aditya: I actually think it was rare. What usually happens is, for the first three, three-and-a-half years; everyone says they’re keeping their options open. And they are, but it’s easy then, because decision-time is still a while away. As you start to get to the business end of law school and there are recruitment opportunities and jobs and offers flying around, that’s when the pressure to make a quick decision mounts. I think at this stage many people who need more time don’t take it. Not to say that if they’re undecided about their career they should turn down all opportunities, but I think whatever they do take up, it should be very clearly in the spirit of ‘testing the waters’. That takes away some of the pressure of the decision and gives them more space to make a real commitment.

Aditya Sudarshan, author of A Nice Quite Holiday
Aditya Sudarshan, author of A Nice Quite Holiday

Rainmaker: The narrator of your novel, Anant, is law clerk to another major character, Justice Harish Shinde – a New Delhi trial court judge. To me, the relationship between judge and clerk was a very interesting aspect of your novel. Can you tell us about your own experiences as a judicial clerk, and its influence on the relationship between Anant and Justice Shinde.
Aditya: Well the clerkship I did was just a month-and-a-half with a Supreme Court judge, so it was obviously very different from the one described in the book. But the general relationship between the clerk and the judge did strike me as interesting. As a clerk you’re spending most of your day, often including Sundays, at the judge’s office – which is also in the judge’s house – you’re working on his speeches and opinions, brain-storming with him, sometimes you might have a meal with him. And yet in formal terms, the gulf between the two of you is massive – you’re a total novice and he’s a judge. With a hierarchy like that, you can hardly be ‘friends’ or even ‘colleagues’. And yet, given how much one-on-one time you’re spending together, he is likely to become something more personal than just a ‘boss.’ Maybe he starts to feel like a mentor – but maybe the clerk doesn’t want a mentor. So it’s an interesting relationship, because it isn’t clear-cut. It has potential for both conflicts and sympathies. (Which is good material for fiction.)

 
Rainmaker: The book is structured like the traditional detective novel, when in fact it deals with much more – small-town morality and politics, to begin with. Is there a reason why you chose this structure?

 
Aditya: Yes, because a detective story naturally involves thinking through a problem, analysing characters and their motivations, and the secrets they might be concealing. It allows a writer to do these things in an open and overt way, which is what I wanted to do. So the way I look at it, it isn’t as though I’m using the structure of a murder mystery as a facade, while really making points about serious issues. The murder mystery itself entails those issues, and hence in the natural course of tackling the mystery I have to tackle them.

Rainmaker: So does this mean that we will see more of the Anant-Justice Shinde team?
Aditya: I hope so. Perhaps not in a novel, but I’d definitely like to write a collection of short mystery stories involving these two.

Rainmaker: Someone once told me that there is a frustrated writer inside every lawyer.
Aditya: I definitely think there’s a connection somewhere. I don’t know if this is true, but my guess is that there’s a disproportionate number of lawyers who have taken up writing, whether full time or part time, as compared to other professionals. There’s Grisham, and there’s Scott Turow who studied at Harvard, and there was John Mortimer of England, who wrote the Rumpole stories. And let’s remember that the young Charles Dickens worked in a lawyer’s office too, wanted at one time to be a barrister, and also put a lot of law into many of his books.

 

So there’s got to be a connection. It’s not that hard to see it either. At least as a litigating lawyer, you’re always coming across two fundamental elements of fiction- characters, in the form of your clients, and plots, in the form of their troubles. So your raw material is the same – human drama. (Then, of course, the way you treat that material is very different.)

Rainmaker: Did legal education and your brief stint in litigation prepare you for your first novel?
Aditya: In one very minor sense yes, because my novel involves some legal details that I wouldn’t have known otherwise. But more fundamentally, I think legal education probably did help prepare me. Legal education does train you to think in structured terms about human emotions, and you need to be able to do that to plan out a novel. And it’s not as though every course lets you do this. Science and mathematics might encourage incisive thought and the ability to theorise, but they don’t have a human element. The humanities subjects are full of the human element, but I think usually at a more abstract level. Only the law seems to really get down to the level of individual people and their relationships and emotions. Obviously it isn’t direct training for fiction writing- but then what is?

 

I don’t think my stint in litigation helped so much. I know I just said that litigation exposes you to characters and plots and that’s true, but as you get into the grind of it, it doesn’t give you the luxury to think of them that way. You can’t afford to think through the deeper motivations of your client, because that’s not why he hired you. You have to try and get him his relief.

 

The other thing about litigation is that its conventions demand that you write in a certain ‘formal’ way and I think that’s often just bad, painful writing. As a fiction writer, you have to take care of your talent. (Maybe that’s why the writer inside the lawyer slowly gets frustrated!)

Rainmaker: So do you see a lot of Indian writing in English to come out of Indian law schools?
Aditya: I do. There is plenty of fiction writing that happens in the law schools. The stumbling block is that law is a professional course and if you follow the natural course of it strictly all the way through, it takes you away from fiction. But if you’re keen enough on writing, then the likelihood is that sooner or later you’re going to do it. I personally know of law school graduates who are writing fiction, or at least actively considering it. And the law schools themselves are still quite young. If I were a betting man I’d bet on this happening.